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Afin d’accroître notre compréhension des marchés émergents nous
analysons une base de données incluant toutes les transactions effectuées sur une
longue période. Le marché, qui, trois années après avoir connu d’importantes
réformes, a été introduit en 1996 dans la base de données de la Société Financière
Internationale (SFI), fonctionne selon un système d’échange dual qui consiste en
un marché pour les transactions de bloc et un marché central. Les transactions ont
été enregistrées séparément pour chacun des segments du marché. Les fourchettes
effectives ainsi que l’impact des transactions de bloc sur les prix sont examinés.
Nous vérifions si les coûts de transaction ont changé de manière significative
depuis les réformes de microstructures. Nous trouvons des coûts de transaction
élevés et prohibitifs qui sont temporaires mais durent néanmoins plus d’une année
et coïncident avec l’incorporation du marché à la base de données de la SFI. Cet
impact temporaire est suivi de coûts de transaction à peu prés égaux à ceux de la
période précédant la réforme. Les résultats que nous obtenons n’appuient pas l’idée
conventionnelle selon laquelle la transparence des marchés et les coûts de
transaction rehaussent, au moins directement, l’émergence du marché.
To enhance our understanding of emerging markets we study a data set
containing all the transaction records over a long span. The market, which was
included in 1996 in the International Finance Corporation (IFC) data base
roughly three years after important market reforms, operated under a dual trading
system, consisting of an upstairs market for large block trades and a trading floor
exchange. Transactions were recorded separately for both segments of the market.
Effective spreads as well as the price impact of large block trades are examined.
We test whether the costs of trading have significantly changed since the stock
market microstructure reforms. We uncover prohibitively expensive trading costs
which are temporary, yet last for over a year and coincide with the incoporation
of the market into the IFC data base. This temporary effect is followed by
transaction costs roughly equal to the pre-reforms era. The results we obtain do
not support the conventional wisdom that market transparency and trading costs
enhance, at least directly, the emergence of a market.
Mots Clés : Structures de marchés, marchés émergents
Keywords : Market structures, emerging markets
1 Introduction
In the world of today isolationism is not a practical policy
The city often associated with a movie classic, staring Humphrey Bogart
as Rick and Ingrid Bergman as Isla, is also the site of an emerging nan-
cial market called the Bourse de Casablanca.
1
It has been the scene of
several structural changes aecting the market's microstructure as well
as the role the stock exchange plays as an engine of the Kingdom of
Morocco's economy. The Bourse de Casablanca was introduced into the
International Finance Corporation (henceforth IFC) Emerging Market
data base in 1996 together with stock exchanges from two other coun-
tries, Egypt and Russia.
2
This paper focuses on the nancial market reforms which led to the
process of emergence and examines how these changes aected the mar-
ket transparency, the quality of the market and the cost of trading. We
have collected transactions data from the Casablanca Stock Exchange,
henceforth called the CSE, using the original historical records of the
exchange which were handwritten registers of the daily trading activity.
The data set contains all the transaction records over a span of twelve
years from a dual market system consisting of an exchange and trading
oor and an upstairs OTC large block trade market. The analysis of such
data allows us to enhance our understanding of emerging markets as the
long span of transactions data from the dual market system enables us
to examine many issues hitherto mainly unaddressed, in particular what
role microstructure reforms played in the emergence of the market.
3
Our results are rather surprising with regard to the role played by
trading costs. It appears that eective spreads became very large, both
by historical standards and in an absolute sense. These increases were
not associated with the onset of new trading rules, instead they appear to
coincide with the time the market gained international recognition as it
was incorporated into the IFC database. The reforms, which took place
roughly three years before the market was incorporated in the IFC data
1
There are many famous lines from the movie Casablanca. Every section in this
paper starts with a quote which relates to the theme of the section. The line heading
the introduction is a quote from Monsieur Ferrare who gives advice to Rick on how
to run his Cafe Americain.
2
Until recently the stock exchange was in fact called Bourse des Valeurs de
Casablanca. In this paper we will use its present ocial French name and the English
translation Casablanca Stock Exchange.
3
The emerging market literature has focused almost exclusively its attention on
asset pricing issues using the IFC data base, due mainly to the lack of transactions
data. Moreover, relatively little attention is paid to the transition dynamics of the
process, see however Bekaert and Harvey (1995).
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base, made hardly any dent in the spreads and other measures of trans-
parencies. The eect of increasing transactions costs, while temporary,
lasted for over a year. Despite the very large trading costs, the market
saw trading volume quadruple, then double the year after, then triple
again once the reforms were put into place. The market index shows
similar spectacular performances. It is also of interest to note that after
the surge, spreads appear to have settled at their pre-reform historical
levels. Admittedly, our paper examines only a small set of stocks and
focuses on one specic market. The type of data we examine is scarce,
however. The results we obtain do not support the conventional wisdom
that market transparency and trading costs enhance, at least directly,
the emergence of a market.
While the changes in the microstructure are the main focus of our
paper we need rst to paint a complete picture of the reforms which took
place in Morocco. In section 2 we discuss the institutional and histor-
ical context of the Bourse de Casablanca and the various events which
transformed the market from a submerged relatively inactive market
in the mid-eighties to a fully operational specialist market towards the
middle of 1995. We conclude section 2 with a preliminary analysis of
the transactions data and report several summary statistics of market
activity throughout dierent phases of reform. In the remaining of the
paper we pay exclusively attention to microstructure issues. Typically
one thinks of quality, eciency and transparency using measures such
as bid-ask spreads, market depth, liquidity, etc. Unfortunately, we can-
not rely on such measures as they simply were not recorded nor even
available for the submerged stages of the market. In section 3 we follow
statistical approaches which rely exclusively on transactions data such
as the Roll (1984) model of eective spreads, the spread between the
large block trade and oor trading market as well as various measures of
liquidity and eective spreads. In addition we extend the work of Has-
brouck (1993) who proposed to decompose security transaction prices
into random walk and stationary components. The former is assumed to
represent the ecient market price. We propose two extensions which
make the decomposition more appropriate for the relatively infrequent
trading which is so typical for submerged and emerging markets. We
also take advantage of the fact that we have observations from two si-
multaneously operating markets with a dierent microstructure and the
same underlying fundamental price process. In section 4 we examine
the price impact of large block trades taking advantage of the data set
which separates block trades from trading oor transactions.
4
Section 5
4
It is rather unusual to have explicit data on large block trades for submerged,
2
concludes the paper.
2 From a Sleepy Place to the Wake-up Call
As one costumer plays upon Rick's advice \22" on the roulette
twice in a row and wins each time, another customer asks:
Are you sure this place is honest, Monsieur Rick?
Rick's answer: Sure.....He's just a lucky guy.
Rick's Cafe Americain was a place where exit visas to the United States
were actively traded, where gambling was tolerated although it was of-
cially banned and special discounts were oered to Rick's friends. Of
course all of this is the ction of a movie and as is often said at the be-
ginning of a novel, any resemblance with actual persons or places is pure
coincidental. Yet, perhaps some of the features apply to the activity of
a pre-emerged or submerged market. The emergence of the CSE was
not simply a matter of changing its microstructure. Many developments
took place, fortunately not all simultaneously. The purpose of this sec-
tion is to briey describe how the CSE originally functioned and changed
over time. We look at several dimensions, including the structural ad-
justment program, the nancial sector reforms and the microstructure of
the CSE. A rst subsection describes the microstructure of the market
and the changes which took place. The next subsection describes the
details of the data we collected. The third subsection covers some pre-
liminary empirical snapshots of the CSE while a nal subsection deals
with the selection of stocks we consider. Appendix A to the paper also
provides details about Morocco's reform and privatization programs.
2.1 The market's microstructure
A stock market reform program was undertaken in the summer of 1993
almost simultaneously with the onset of an ambitious privatization pro-
gram. On September 21 1993 three laws (so called Dahir) came into
eect regarding: (1) the Casablanca Stock Exchange, (2) the securities
commission (Conseil Deontologique des Valeurs Mobilieres) and (3) the
creation of mutual funds. The new laws included changes in the manage-
ment and organization of the stock exchange. In addition, changes were
made to the waymutual funds operate, scal advantages were established
emerging or emerged markets. Typically such trades are ltered from transactions
data, usually with the consequence of data errors. Some exceptions exist, notably
Kiem and Madhavan (1996).
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for shareholders and new regulations for shareholder protection were in-
stalled. The reforms were to a large extent anticipated. Indeed, since
1989 the country embarked on several reform programs which aected
many dimensions of the economy (see Appendix A for more details).
The actors operating on the CSE prior to the reforms of 1993 were the
major domestic banks. Trades were executed by employees from these
institutions, none of the traders were acting on their own account. The
exchange was extremely illiquid, as most stocks did not trade for several
weeks. In the next subsection we will provide more details regarding
trading activity. The exchange personnel recorded with chalk the latest
transaction prices on a large blackboard. Not all trades passed through
the trading oor as large blocks typically traded OTC. Such trades were
also handled by the same banks which operated oor trading but the
OTC trades were not directly exposed to the trading oor (more on this
later). The most actively traded stocks were banks and holding compa-
nies as well as a few agricultural sector rms. Hence the domestic banks
were mostly trading their own stocks. Banks played also a dominant role
in the supply of credit (at pegged interest rates) to corporations. More-
over, they typically had privileged access to the nancial statements of
their clients. Lack of public disclosure laws implied that some corpora-
tions did not publish nancial statements.
The CSE was privatized with the reforms of September 1993 and
the new owners were an association of dealers. Permits to operate were
given to 14 market makers who act as specialists in roughly the 50 stocks
traded on the exchange. The CSE trading hours are Monday to Friday
from 10 AM until noon and transactions take either place on the trad-
ing oor (called Marche Ociel) or the upstairs OTC market (called
Cession Directe). The dierences between the two are similar to for in-
stance the NYSE. Namely, in the upstairs market, large transactions are
accomplished through a search-brokerage mechanism where an interme-
diary or broker locates counter-parties to a trade (see e.g. Burdett and
O'Hara (1987), Grossman (1992), Seppi (1990) and Kiem and Madha-
van (1996) for a more elaborate and theoretical discussion). In contrast,
the downstairs market relies on market makers who provide liquidity on
demand.
5
Since May 15 1995 a document called Protocole de Place organizes
5
There is an important dierence between the CSE and the NYSE, however. As
Hasbrouck, Soanos and Sosebee (1993) and Kiem and Madhaven (1996) note, under
NYSE rule 76 it is generally illegal to pre-negotiate trades on the NYSE as the order
must be exposed to the public in accordance with auction principles with time and
price priority. This restriction does not apply on the CSE. Large trades may occur
without public exposure, at least until the next trading day.
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the procedures, payment, delivery and compensation for the CSE. This
protocol describes the transactions procedures for both the trading oor
and the OTC markets. The laws of September 1993 created a number
of new institutions and signicantly changed the incentive structures of
trading, yet it took time to implement those changes. The new protocol
of May 15 1995 had a profound impact on the incentives for dealers to
trade as it formally implemented into trading practice the laws of 1993.
Yet, trading volume picked up long before May 1995 so that the new
protocol was to a large extent conrming established practices. Finally,
it is worth noting that the CSE adopted the French screen-driven trading
system of the Bourse de Paris (see Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) for
further description) on December 17th 1996. So far we have not collected
enough recent data to cover this episode but plan to do so in future work.
Before turning our attention to the transactions data it is worth pro-
viding rst a general appraisal of the CSE before and after the reform
programs. Table 2.1 presents a selection of basic indicators regarding
the CSE from 1989, the year the reform programs were announced, until
1996. Table 2.1 provides on an annual basis (1) the number of trading
days, (2) the trading volume (million of Dirhams, the Moroccan currency
denoted DH, one US dollar is roughly 9 DH), (3) market capitalization,
(4) a measure of liquidity (trading volume/market capitalization), (5)
dividend yields, and (6) the value of a market index on the last day of
the year. These basic statistics reveal how trading volume, liquidity and
returns exploded (in relative terms) during this seven year window cov-
ering the pre-reform and post-reform eras. The liquidity index, perhaps
the most important basic indicator for what will be discussed in the next
sections, went from a meager 2.4 % to 25.8 %. We also note that in 1993,
when the rst CSE reforms were put into law, trading volume quadru-
pled, then doubled the year after, then tripled again. The market index
shows similar spectacular performances. Obviously, in absolute terms
there is no comparison with any developed nancial market, yet the rel-
ative turnaround is remarkable. Indeed, in relative terms the market
underwent something close to a big bang in a short amount of time.
2.2 Description of the Data
We collected a data set containing all the trades which took place on
the trading oor, i.e. Marche Ociel, henceforth denoted MO, and
the upstairs large block trade market, also called the Cession Directe,
henceforth denoted CD. Each entry was obtained from the original CSE
records which contains the name of the stock, the price of the transaction,
the number of shares, the market where the transaction was recorded and
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the day of the transaction. We do not have a time stamp other than the
calendar date of the transaction. Lacking this intra-day information we
do not know at what time between 10 AM and noon a transaction took
place on the trading oor or what time the parties agreed to transact
on the upstairs market. However, we have some knowledge of the intra-
day timing of trades since the order of the registration in the original
records respects the chronological order of the execution.
6
The data set
runs from January 1st 1984 until March 31 1997. Roughly between 50
to 65 stocks are typically traded on the CSE. They are divided into the
following sectors: banking, nancial services other than banking, energy
and mining, agriculture, industrial and services. The reforms which
came into eect on September 21 1993 were so important in terms of the
organization of the market (the previous reforms date from 1967) that
we decided to take this date as a sample split. Hence, a rst subsample,
denoted S1, covers the pre-reform period which runs from the beginning
of the sample until September 20 1993. The second sample S2 runs from
September 21 1993 until March 31 1997, i.e. the end of the sample. Many
of the summary statistics will be calculated using this particular sample
split with the reform laws as the benchmark. Obviously this may be
criticized since on the one hand many of the changes were anticipated
following the widely publicized announcements of reforms and on the
other hand many of the legal changes only materialized in the daily
practice of trading after September 21, 1993. Our statistical analysis will
therefore not be limited to a xed break. Indeed, we will conduct tests for
any \structural changes" in key measures of market quality, to be dened
later, without presuming a priori a xed breakpoint. Moreover, we will
also examine several statistics on a month-by-month basis and assess the
dynamic pattern of the market's trading costs. We will also construct
various subsample, other than S1 and S2, to appraise the robustness of
our results. In particular, for reasons that will become apparent later,
we will also consider a sample denoted S3 which covers January 1, 1984
until December 31, 1995. Hence, in S3 all observations pertaining to 1996
and 1997 are deleted. Likewise we will also consider S4 which runs from
September 21, 1993 until December 31, 1995 which excludes the same
observations from the sample S2. For the moment, it will be convenient
to focus on S1 and S2, i.e. obesrvations before and after the reforms, as
6
The records on the timing may not be as accurate for the CD market. It is
very rare that OTC trades take place after 4 PM and are therefore reported on the
next day. The majority of OTC trades are not reported before noon, however, the
time when oor trading ends. With the same caveat we also know the sequence of
transactions which they took place on dierent segments of the market (CD versus
MO) on the same day. This allows us to compute intra-day returns on a tick-by-tick
basis either on each segment of the market or both markets together.
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a rst cut of the data.
The two subsamples S1 and S2 are very uneven in terms of the time
span they cover. Yet, as the focus of the empirical analysis will be
microstructure models it is more relevant to compare the two samples
on the basis of the number of observations, i.e. transactions. In Table
2.2 we report the sample sizes for each of the subsamples and each of the
market segments. While S1 covers almost a decade and S2 less than four
years we note from Table 2.2 that S1 counts roughly 11; 000 transactions
while S2 has more than 16; 000. About two thirds of the transactions
take place on the trading oor, respectively 7433 for S1 and 11378 for
S2.
We report in Table 2.3 the capitalization, number of shares and the
number of stocks on the CSE. In Table A.1 (appearing in Appendix A) we
provide a more detailed list of all individual stocks, their capitalization,
number of shares, etc. In both tables we report only three pivotal dates
which are related to the sample split, beginning and end.
7
We note
that at the beginning of the sample a total of 62 stocks were traded.
The number of stocks gradually declined to 48, despite the introduction
of new stocks through the privatization program. Indeed, some stocks
were de-listed by the CSE's watchdog, namely the Conseil Deontologique
des Valeurs Mobilieres, because the companies did not comply with
the newly installed regulations (in September 1993) regarding public
disclosure of corporate nancial statements according to an accepted
accounting standard. The detailed summary in Table A.1 provides the
names of each of the stocks, including the de-listed ones. It also provides
the number of shares and the stock price at three pivotal dates in our
sample (beginning, end of S1 and S2). The market capitalization rose
41-fold from the end of S1 until the end of S2, while the number of shares
traded quintupled.
2.3 A First Look at Market Activity
In this section we examine overall trading activity and focus on some
individual stocks which will be the primary focus of our analysis in the
subsequent two sections. In Table 2.4 we report how trading changed
dramatically from subsample S1 to S2. Before the reforms took place
there were an average of four trades on a daily basis, roughly three on the
MO market and one on CD. Hence, the CSE was clearly a very inactive
market. Table 2.4 also contains the frequency distributions. We note
that for 32 % of the trading days in S1 there were no trades registered
7
Since market capitalizations are only changed at the end of the month we list the
months corresponding to the sample split date.
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on the trading oor (MO market) and 70 % of the days were without
trade on the upstairs CD market. These gures dropped to 5 % and
19 % respectively in S2. Hence, activity picked up remarkably in S2, as
trading frequencies more than quadrupled and hardly any day goes by
without trading. Both segments of the market combined have 72 % of
the days more than 10 trades during S2, more than three times the 24
% of days which showed not a single trade in S1.
As the main focus of our analysis will be on transaction-based data
let us examine now trading activity in some individual stocks. A total
of 28 stocks, which rank as the most actively and continuously traded,
are listed in Table 2.5. For each stock we have the daily average number
of trades and average number of shares on both segments of the mar-
ket in each subsample. When we compare the average daily volume we
observe that the CD market takes the lion share of the volume, though
there is one notable exception which is ONA, the most actively traded
stock, where the trading oor takes a larger share of the volume after
the reforms. The fact that the CD market takes the lion share of the
volume should not be a surprise as it is a large block trading market.
8
.
The MO market, in contrast, is more active in terms of trading fre-
quency, with smaller volumes. As we noted before, prior to the reforms
the most actively traded stocks were nancial services companies, with
a few exceptions like Brasseries du Maroc, Ciments d'Agadir, Lessieur
Afrique and to a certain extent the most actively traded ONA stock
which is a nancial holding company. Most active stocks followed the
market trend after the reforms in terms of increased trading frequencies,
though some stocks regressed or stayed at the same frequencies. Exam-
ples include in fact the agricultural sector stocks Brasseries du Maroc,
Ciments d'Agadir and Lessieur Afrique. It should also be noted that the
least actively traded stocks during S1 appearing in Table 2.5 remained
relatively inactive.
This rst examination of the transactions data reveals that the re-
forms had a strong impact on trading patterns and seem to suggest that
the trading oor market became rapidly an active market with rela-
tively small volumes of trade. The upstairs market performed the role of
large block trades with a much more important part of the daily volume
channeled through this segment of the market, although it did not in-
crease dramatically in activity in terms of trading frequency. A handful
of stocks beneted from this increased activity, while most other stocks
trailed. Those which beneted are concentrated in the banking sector as
8
It is also worth noting that for some of the less actively traded stocks transact
primarily on the upstairs market (Cadem and Auto   Hall appearing in Table 2.5
being perfect examples)
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well as holding companies and were the largest stocks before the reforms
as well.
2.4 The selection of stocks
Before we discuss modeling and estimation issues, we briey list the
stocks we will focus on and explain why they were selected. We noted
from the trading statistics in Table 2.5 that the least active stocks re-
mained inactive after the reforms. Hence, the gains were primarily in
the top tier of the market. It will therefore be of interest to see whether
the market reforms made any dent in the cost of trading for stocks in
the top tier. We will focus on three groups of four stocks making a total
of twelve active stocks. We have chosen the three groups to disentangle
several eects, particularly pertaining to microstructure reforms and pri-
vatizations. Before introducing any specic stocks let us recall that the
bid-ask spread is assumed to have dierent components. Indeed, the-
oretical models about the marketmaking process suggest that spreads
have three components: (1) order processing, (2) adverse information
and (3) inventory holding costs. There are certainly several features of
Morocco's reform package which had potentially an impact on one or
several components of the bid-ask spread. It was noted before that the
privatization program brought liquidity to the market. Among the basic
indicators which appeared in Table 2.1 we noted that market liquidity
improved dramatically. In Appendix A it is also observed that roughly
9 billion DH, or 1 billion US dollars, worth of new equity through IPO's
and seasoned equity oerings was created. The inux of new shares
probably had a positive impact on liquidity particularly in the case of
seasoned equity oerings involving shares already listed on the exchange
prior to the reform programs. Several of the rms appearing in Table 2.5
were the subject of privatizations.
9
For instance BMCE, a commercial
bank which was among the rst major privatization operations, saw its
number of shares quadruple roughly a year after the September 1993
CSE reforms. The transportation rm CTM which was privatized right
before the market reforms took place saw its number of shares in cir-
culation triple. The number of shares traded on the SCE quintupled
for the nancial holding SNI which was privatized roughly a year af-
ter the market was reformed. Its privatization was roughly at the same
time as BMCE and involved a slightly larger amount of capital.
10
These
9
See Table A.2 in Appendix A for details regarding the privatization of rms.
10
A total of 1781.6 million Dirhams for BMCE versus 2030 million Dirhams for
SNI. The former involved a larger fraction of shares sold to the public as opposed to
a consortium of large institutional share holders.
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are a few examples illostrating how the privatization program injected
liquidity. The reforms also brought more transparency through the -
nancial statement reporting requirements which were introduced in the
summer of 1993. These disclosure laws brought more information in the
public domain and therefore may have diminished the adverse selection
component. The fact that marketmakers operated on their own account
since the reforms and the increased trading volume should probably have
made a dent in the order processing costs as well.
The rst group consists of four stocks in the banking sector: CMCB,
BMCI, BCM and BMCE. These four stocks share many common fea-
tures, namely they are in the same sector, they gured also among the
actively traded stocks before and after the reforms. There is one stock,
namely BMCE, which was the subject of a major privatization which
took place in December 1994, i.e. over a year after the microstructure
reforms of September 1993. Hence, unlike the three other banks we have
for BMCE a combination of a seasoned equity oering and changes in the
trading/dealer incentives. The second batch of four stocks is also a group
of equities belonging to the same sector, namely that of nancial holding
companies. It also contains a combination of rms which were privatized
rms and others which were not. The group contains the most actively
traded stock throughout the period, namelyONA. The three other stocks
are : Credit Eqdom and two rms which were subject of privatizations,
namely Sofac Credit and SNI. Here the privatizations took place in May
1994 for the rst, while SNI was in October 1994. The nal group of
four stocks does not contain banks or holding companies nor does it con-
tain privatized rms. It also includes some rms which dropped in the
rankings in terms of average trading frequencies according to the results
listed in Table 2.5. The group consists of: Brasseries du Maroc, Lessieur
Afrique, Cosumar and Centrale Laitiere. All these stocks belong to Mo-
rocco's most important sector in the economy, namely the agricultural
sector. This rather divers selection of twelve stocks exhibits dierent fea-
tures and allows us to make comparisons and to a certain extent control
for sectoral and privatization eects. This selection of stocks will gure
from now on prominently in all of our empirical analysis.
To conclude this section we report some rst regression results in-
volving the selection of twelve stocks. Namely the following regressions
are reported in Table 2.6:
r

= 
01
+ 
11
r
 1
+ "

r
2

= 
02
+ 
12
r
2
 1
+ "

v

= 
0v
+ 
1v
v
 1
+ "
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where r

represents the transaction-based return series and v

is the vol-
ume. Only the slope estimates of 
1i
for i = 1; 2 and v are reported in the
table for the two subsamples S1 and S2. The regressions are estimated
via OLS whereas the standard errors are computed using the Newey and
West (1987) procedure. The results of the rst regression show that the
rst autoregressive coecient is more negative in S2 compared to the es-
timates obtained with S1 data. There are a few exceptions, namely SNI,
Cosumar and Centrale Laitiere. In those cases the coecients became
smaller in magnitude, although the standard error increased as well sug-
gesting less precision of the S2 estimates. The OLS estimates converges
to cov(r

; r
 1
)=var(r
 1
) where the covariance is negative due to the
bid-ask bounce. Therefore, as 
11
becomes more negative we nd evi-
dence that the covariance is more important relative to the variance of
r

during S2. This is a rst indication that spreads may have increased
substantially during S2. This issue will be further explored in the next
section. The next set of columns considers autoregression in volatility.
Volatility became clearly more persistent. For some stocks during S1 we
observe even negative coecients. All autoregressive coecients have
the expected positive sign during S2, except for Cosumar which shows
statistically insignicant autocorrelation in both samples. Finally, the
last two columns in Table 2.6 pertain to trading volume. The results
feature the same pattern as volatility, namely with some exceptions we
note that trading volume became more positively autocorrelated.
3 The quality of the market through the
stages of reform
Captain Renault to Rick: What brought you to Casablanca?
Rick: My health....I came to Casablanca for the waters.
Captain Renault: Waters?...what waters?...it is the desert here!
Rick: I was misinformed....
This is the rst of two sections dealing with the core question of our
paper, namely: How much did microstructure reforms contribute to the
emergence of the Bourse de Casablanca? The purpose of this section is
an attempt to assess the quality of the market, as microstructure nance
theorists view it, throughout the dierent stages of reforms. Obviously
we need rst to explain what is meant by quality. Typically one thinks
of measures such as bid-ask spreads, market depth and liquidity, etc.
to discuss microstructure features of a stock market.
11
Unfortunately,
11
There are numerous examples of studies assessing market performance, market
11
we cannot rely on such measures as they simply were not systemati-
cally recorded for a submerged market like the CSE. Indeed, despite the
unique attributes of our data set, it should be noted that the transaction-
based data are the only common thread through the dierent market
structures. Bid and ask quotes, for instance, are generated in nan-
cial market environments which are more mature and driven by actively
participating specialists or market makers. For the CSE, such a mar-
ket structure was gradually established and completed by May 1995.
12
The time series properties of the transaction prices will therefore be our
only guidance to appraise the evolution of the market through its various
stages of reform. Various statistical approaches exist to do this. We will
consider several approaches as we want our conclusions not to depend
on the implicit assumptions embedded in one specic class of models.
3.1 Plots and Descriptive Statistics
As a prelude to the formal model-based estimates and tests we examine
several plots which appear in Figures 1 through 3. They portray a picture
of market activity and quality for individual stocks. Each gure has
twelve plots, namely three graphs for a set of four stocks. Figure 1
displays monthly estimates of volatility, monthly high-low spreads and
monthly Roll (1984) model spreads.
13
All the calculations appearing in
the gures are based on trading oor data.
14
The top row of plots in
Figure 1 show the monthly volatility estimates of CMCB, BMCI, BCM
and BMCE. The next row shows the monthly high-low spreads whereas
the lower panel displays the Roll spreads. The monthly high-low spreads
could be viewed as a \model-free" upperbound on the actual spreads
which, as noted before, we do not have whereas the Roll spreads are based
structure and regulatory impact via bid-ask spreads, liquidity ratios, daily high-low
midpoints and other measures. Some examples are Cooper, Groth and Avera (1985),
Hasbrouck and Schwarz (1988), Grossman and Miller (1988), Neal (1989), Commodi-
ties and Futures Trading Commission (1989) and Tanner and Pritchett (1992). Such
studies were applied to various OTC and specialist markets in equities and derivative
securities.
12
On occasion a bid and ask was quoted for a stock in the monthly CSE bulletin
which summarized market activity. There was no systematic record keeping of bid
and ask quotes, however, and the data would most likely reect stale quotes.
13
Details regarding the calculations of the Roll model spreads are deferred to the
next section.
14
It was noted that the nature of our data does not really allow us to investigate
explicitly the tick-by-tick process since we do not have the intra-day time stamp of
the transactions on the trading oor and OTC markets. Fortunately, we know the
sequence of transactions as they occurred throughout a day on the dierent segments
of the market (CD versus MO). This allows us to compute intra-day returns from
trading in a particular stock.
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on a very explicit set of assumptions (more on this later). The vertical
lines on each graph are the sample splits between S1 and S2: Three
of the four stocks show very much the same pattern. Volatility, high-
low and Roll spreads increased dramatically, but long after the reforms
were put into place. Table 3.1, which complements Figure 1, contains the
cross-correlations of the three series appearing in the set of two gures.
15
The cross-correlations are computed for all twelve stocks separately over
samples S1 and S2: We also computed, but do not report, the cross-
correlations for other samples, like S3 and S4. We found, perhaps not
surprisingly, that excluding 1996-1997 yielded estimates roughly equal
across S1, S3 and S4. The eight stocks in Table 3.1 not appearing in
Figure 1 are covered in the subsequent two gures, Figure 2 for ONA,
Credit Eqdom, Sofac Credit and SNI and Figure 3 for Brasseries du
Maroc, Lessieur Afrique, Cosumar and Centrale Laitiere.
Among the four nancial institutions we observe very similar patterns
for BCM, BMCE and BMCI. They show a very quiet market with a burst
in volatility, monthly averages of daily high-lows (on the trading oor
market) and Roll spreads. Quite suprisingly this sudden increase does
not coincide with any of the reform dates, i.e. neither the September 21
1993 nor May 15 1995. The sharp increases all occur January/February
1996, the time when the Casablanca Stock Exchange drew a lot of in-
ternational attention.
16
The spreads estimated via the Roll model for
the entire sample range from roughly 4 % to 19 % (see the column la-
beled to S
MO
F
in Table 3.2), obviously suggesting extremely large bid-ask
spreads. It should be noted, however, that such large spreads are not
totally unreasonable nor unusual, indeed Easley et al. (1996) report
similar gures for infrequently traded stocks listed on the London Stock
Exchange.
17
Prior to the reforms the spreads were below 3.5 %, during
the S2 sample they sky-rocketed to 40 %. The pattern for CMCB is very
dierent, but so is the scale of magnitude. The Roll spreads are roughly
4 % throughout the sample.
18
Another noteworthy point to make is that
the BMCE stock does not show any sign of increased volatility around
December 1994, the time of its privatization. Despite the fact it was the
rst major privatization roughly a year after the market reform, nothing
seems to have happened with the transaction prices.
15
Table 3.1 also contains cross-correlations of series which will be discussed later
in Section 4.
16
Recall that 1996 was the year the CSE was incorporated into the IFC data base.
It is also worth noting that there does not seem to be any announcement eect late
1995 regarding the incorporation of the CSE into the IFC.
17
We quote percentage gures in the text while the plots are on a decimal scale.
18
Descriptive statistics regarding the spreads and the other series appearing in
Figure 1 will be provided in Table 3.2 which will be discussed later.
13
Figure 2 displays the volatility, high-low and Roll spreads for ONA
and three other stocks, namely Credit Eqdom and two rms which, as
noted before, were also the subject of privatizations, namely Sofac Credit
and SNI. These privatizations took place before that of BMCE, namely
the former took place in May 1994 while the SNI privatization was in
October 1994. The four stocks in Figure 2 show more heterogeneous
patterns, though the spikes in volatility starting in 1996 re-occur for
all stocks except Sofac Credit. The rst stock in Figure 2, ONA has
low spreads, and only a few volatility spikes towards the end of the
sample. As ONA is the most frequently traded stock throughout the
sample this is obviously an interesting case. Among the other stocks
Sofac Credit does not show the upsurge in volatility starting in 1996,
instead it has a sharp peak in December 1992. The high-low spreads,
however, climb around the time of the privatization in May 1994. The
Roll spreads show a downward trend before the reforms and peak around
the privatization as well as in 1996. SNI was another pilot privatization
involving 2030 million Dirhams (see Table A.2) as opposed to only 130.8
million Dirhams for Sofac Credit. Both the high-low and Roll spreads
show large increases right before the market reforms as well as at the
time of the privatization roughly one year thereafter. The two privatized
rms appearing in Figure 2 therefore display a pattern very dierent from
BMCE which showed hardly any movement of volatility nor spreads
around the time its shares went public. The spreads increased rather
than decreased however. Credit Eqdom in Figure 2 shows a fairly at
spread pattern unaected by the reforms and features also a strong uprise
in volatility and spreads at the very end of the sample.
The four remaining stocks are covered in Figure 3. This group does
not contain banks or holding companies nor does it contain privatized
rms. It also includes rms which dropped in the rankings in terms of
trading frequencies. Three stocks, namely Brasseries du Maroc, Lessieur
Afrique and Cosumar show the by now familiar pattern of at volatility
and spread pattern until 1996. The only exception is Centrale Laitiere
which showed some activity around the time of the reforms. However,
as the scale is minor this is probably like BMCE and ONA no signicant
event. The huge increases in spreads are economically very important
and probably also statistically signicant. Obviously, we don't need very
much statistics for assessing the changes after January 1996. But the
issue of signicant changes if we only look up to 1996 (which is a serious
window of more than two years after the reforms) is more subtle and
requires a more sophisticated approach.
The purpose of the plots was to give a rst impression of the histor-
ical patterns. At this point we need to replace descriptive statistics by
14
more formal tests, which is the subject of the remainder of this section.
Before we leave the subject of descriptive statistics, let us examine the
results appearing in Table 3.1 which complement the plots. In Table
3.1 we investigate the cross-correlations between volatility, Roll spreads
and the high-low spreads to see how much they are interrelated. The
rst observation is that volatility and high-low spreads are, not surpris-
ingly, positively correlated. The correlation between Roll spreads and
volatility is usually positive, i.e. spreads again go up as expected as
volatility increases, but there are also quite a few cases of negative cor-
relations between Roll spreads and volatility (and high-low spreads as
well). For most of the twelve stocks the correlation between Roll spreads
and volatility grew stronger from sample S1 to S2. The stocks are BCM,
ONA and Brasseries du Maroc. For some stocks there was a negative
correlation before the reforms which turned positive. Those stocks are
BMCI, BMCE, Sofac Credit and Lessieur Afrique. Three stocks show
positive correlation during S1 which turns into negative correlations af-
ter the reforms. Those three are CMCB, SNI and Cosumar. Finally,
Credit Eqdom and Centrale Laitiere show only weak positive correlation
between Roll spreads and volatility as well as monthly high-low spreads.
Hence, the picture is mixed when we consider the comovements between
spreads and volatility. One conclusion one must draw from the cross-
correlations in Table 3.1 is that the increase in spreads is not purely a
reection of increased volatility.
3.2 Microstructure Models
We have identied several potential eects the market reforms and the
emergence of the CSE may have had on the components of the bid-ask
spread. So far most of these eects are only speculations. The graphs
which appeared in the previous section gave us a rst indication on how
the market responded to the reforms. The plots were based on \noisy"
statistics involving monthly averages of data. The microstructure mod-
els introduced here are meant to appraise the empirical signicance and
importance of these changes. Econometric methods for uncovering eec-
tive spreads and their components from transactions data rest on certain
assumptions regarding the behavior and/or presence of each to the three
components of the bid-ask spread. The plots in the previous section
displayed monthly estimates of spreads based on the model pioneered
by Roll (1984). Inferences about the bid-ask spread in Roll's model
are made from the autocovariance properties of observed transactions
15
prices.
19
We will start from this simple model and then proceed to more
complex ones. The Roll (1984) model assumes only the existence of the
order processing cost, and hence the absence of inventory costs, while
the trade ow is i:i:d: without any adverse information eects. Under
these assumptions the eective spread, denoted S
MO
as it will be ap-
plied to the trading oor data, can be recovered from transactions prices
as follows:
S
MO
= 2
p
 Cov(p

;p
 1
); (1)
where p

 p

  p
 1
: where p

denotes the logarithm of the trans-
actions price. We will start with an implementation of Roll's model
which is more elaborate than the graphical display discussed in the pre-
vious section and then move to a second and complementary approach
inspired by Hasbrouck (1993).
20
We will also exploit some of its features
to deal more explicitly with the non-cooperative emerging market data
context, in particular the diculties associated with highly inactive mar-
kets, an issue which we ignored to a large extent so far. Moreover, the
estimates of the Roll model rely exclusively on the trading oor market
data whereas the extended Hasbrouck model will take advantage of the
separate registration of trades which are excecuted upstairs and on the
trading oor.
Hasbrouck (1993) suggested to identify the random walk component
of security transaction prices as the ecient price of a stock.
21
The
residual stationary component is taken as the implicit transaction cost
and is therefore termed the pricing error. Hence it is assumed that
the logarithm of the transactions price, which is denoted as p

, can be
decomposed as:
p

= m

+ s

; (2)
where m

is the ecient price, specied as follows:
m

= m
 1
+ !

; (3)
19
See also Choi, Salandro and Shastri (1988), Stoll (1989) and George, Kaul and
Nimalendran (1991) for related work.
20
We could not implement models which infer the spread via trade indicator re-
gressions, as suggested by Glosten and Harris (1988). Since we do not have bid and
ask quotes we cannot sign trades, relying on bid-ask midpoints or an algorithm such
as that described by Lee and Ready (1991).
21
The random walk hypothesis for stock prices has been called into question, see
e.g. Fama and French (1988), Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Poterba and Summers
(1988), among others. Hasbrouck correctly points out that violation of this hypothesis
entails a misspecication which is important for the analysis of long term trends but
is of lesser importance for the high frequency study of microstructures.
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with !

a serially uncorrelated process with E!

= 0 and E!
2

= 
2
!
.
The process s

represents the pricing error and is related to the trans-
action cost as the buyer incurs a cost equal to s

while a seller faces a
cost which amounts to  s

. Hasbrouck (1993) does not allow for het-
eroskedasticity in !

nor in s

and relies on the assumption that events
arrive at a reasonably uniform rate in transactions time, after accounting
for an intra-day seasonal, to justify the assumption of homoskedasticity.
While for an active market like th NYSE such an assumption may be
appropriate, it is clear that for a stock market with infrequent trading it
would probably be dicult to maintain the homoskedastic specication
adopted by Hasbrouck regardless whether transactions time or calendar
time is used. Henceforth we will use  for transactions time and denote
calendar time by t. To accommodate infrequent trading we start from
a random walk model in transactions time similar to Hasbrouck and
augment it with a drift term , to obtain in calendar time t:
m
t
= 
t
+m
t 1
+ (
t
)
1=2
!
t
; (4)
where 
t
represents the duration in calendar time between two consec-
utive trades. Hence the time deformed random walk becomes a random
walk in t with an innovation variance and drift proportional to the du-
ration between trades.
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We defer all the technical details to Appendix
B where we show that the model can be written as:
E
 
(p
j
t
  p
L
t 1
)  
L
t

2
= E
 
(
L
t
)
1=2
(!
t
+ s
j
t
  s
L
t 1
)

2
(5)
for j =MO and CD. Since the process 
L
t
, which is dened in Appendix
B and relates to the 
t
process, is observable we can estimate parameters
not involving unobserved components via a set of moment conditions
using transactions data from the two markets. We can denote the right
hand side of (5) as the variances 
2
CD
and 
2
MO
when normalized by

L
. From the left hand side of (5) we note that the two equations
share the common component 
2
!
which is of interest to us. Note that
we will not extract 
2
!
from the data, rather we will take advantage of
having observations from MO and CD sharing the same underlying !
t
to formulate certain hypotheses.
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For further details see Ghysels, Gourieroux and Jasiak (1996) who provide an
elaborate description of the time deformed random walk and other processes. It
should be noted that Hasbrouck (1993) did not include a drift. He relied on Merton
(1980) who noted that for data samples that are brief in calendar time the standard
error of the return is better estimated with a zero drift specication. We added a
drift term as we no longer have the situation of sampling high frequency data.
17
3.3 Estimation and Testing
The models discussed in the previous section provide estimates of the
(eective) spread or pricing error. We are interested in testing whether
the eective spreads have fundamentally changed over the course of the
transitions and emergence of the market. In this section we will present
the estimators for the parameters of interest and also present the statis-
tics which we will use to test the hypothesis of structural change. We
will rst focus on hypothesis testing and use the Roll model as a leading
example, since it is relatively simple. Next we will elaborate on the esti-
mation and testing of the pricing error models presented in the previous
section.
Recall that the spread in the Roll model is denoted S and is obtained
from (1). We will estimate S
MO
via a GMM procedure which exploits
this equation. Namely, let us consider the moment conditions:
T
X
t=1

 
 
p
j
t
p
j
t 1

 
 
S
MO

2
=4

=T = 0 (6)
We can estimate (6) over samples Si for i = 1; 2; 3 and 4 separately.
We denote such estimates
^
S
MO
i
for i = 1; 2; 3 and 4: Alternatively, we
could estimate S
MO
over the full sample which we will denote
^
S
MO
F
: It is
important to note that the estimation strategy is slightly dierent from
the results reported in Figures 1 through 3 where estimates were plotted
using one month of data. A rst test consists of comparing, say
^
S
MO
1
and
^
S
MO
2
, and see whether they are statistically signicantly dierent.
Hence we test formally whether there have been any changes in the eec-
tive spreads with the market reform as a given breakpoint. Obviously,
the use of a xed breakpoint can easily be criticized. Moreover, the plots
of monthly spreads also revealed that the reform date may not be such
an obvious breakpoint. We therefore conduct various other tests. Some
still consist of picking a breakpoint, like comparing S1 with a subsample
of S4 deleting all observations pertaining to 1996-1997. This comparison
allows us to investigate changes due to reforms without contaminating
our results by the sudden surge of volatility which started in 1996. The
same argument applies to comparisons involving S3, i.e. the entire sam-
ple stripped from all observations pertaining to 1996-1997. Furthermore,
we will also consider tests which operate on the premise of an unknown
breakpoint. We can formulate this hypothesis as follows:
H
o
: S
MO
t
= S
MO
8t = 1; : : : ; T (7)
Hence, we assume that the eective spread for any point in time is
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constant. A great variety of tests for structural change for models esti-
mated by GMM exists.
23
The majority of tests assume as an alternative
that at some point in the sample there is a single structural break, like
for instance: S
R
t
= S
R
a
t = 1; :::; T and S
R
b
t = T
j
+1; :::; T; where
 determines the fraction of the sample before and after the assumed
break point. The idea of a single breakpoint of unknown date is appeal-
ing as it may be that events other than the September 1993 reforms are
relevant. Moreover, a single breakpoint is only an explicit alternative,
the tests have indeed power against more complex alternatives as well.
24
We conduct these tests on the entire sample as well as the sample not
including 1996-1997 data, i.e. the S3 sample.
We can also entertain the same tests for the extended Hasbrouck
model. These tests allow us to address the following question: did either
the quality of the market change or did the fundamental price component
!
t
, which we do not explicitly identify, change its structure (including its
relationship with the pricing error { something which we do not identify
explicitly). The advantage of the two market segments is that we also
can test whether 
2
MO
= 
2
CD
despite the dierences in market structure.
If they are not equal we can simply infer from the relative magnitude of

MO
versus 
CD
which market is higher quality, i.e. more transparent.
3.4 Eective spreads
In Table 3.2 we report the estimates of the eective spreads of the Roll
model obtained from (6) using transactions data for the twelve stocks
we selected.
25
We report ve estimates of the spread, namely S
MO
i
for
i = 1,2,3,4 and F. Besides the estimates we also report the standard
errors. The rst batch of four stocks pertain to the banking sector and
correspond to the set of four appearing in Figure 1. Except for CMCB
the spreads increased from the rst S1 to the second subsample S2. All
the estimates are also very imprecise when we examine standard errors.
23
Relevant references include Andrews (1993), Andrews and Ploberger (1994), Ghy-
sels, Guay and Hall (1996), among others.
24
We use the SupLM, or supremum LM, test proposed by Andrews (1993) and
used for instance in Ghysels (1998) to assess structural change in conditional CAPM
models. One computes the supremum of all LM tests, or score tests, over all possible
break points T . Andrews (1993) tabulated the asymptotic null distribution for the
supremum. The SupLM test has the great advantage that it only uses the parameter
estimates
^
S
MO
F
obtained from the full sample. This saves enormously on computa-
tions, avoiding all the GMM parameter estimations over the various subsamples.
25
We noted that the strong assumptions of the Roll model are not applicable for
a search brokerage market. We nevertheless did compute the estimates for the CD
segment. While the spreads bear little resemblance with their MO counterparts they
yielded the same type of results for the 
2
and SupLM tests reported in Table 3.2.
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We nd nevertheless that the spreads are statistically signicantly dif-
ferent for all stocks except CMCB, which shows a decrease in its spread.
The SupLM statistics conrm the results for the 
2
statistic for two
out of the three stocks featuring structural change with a xed break.
These rst results are surely not very encouraging as they indicate that
if anything happened was a worsening of trading costs. However, the
columns reporting the resulting for the samples S3 and S4 paint a dif-
ferent picture. It is worth rst recalling that these subsamples cover
January 1, 1984 until December 31, 1996 S3 and September 21, 1993
until December 31, 1996 S4. It appears from the results for S3 and S4
that the outrageous spreads are a temporary phenomenon unrelated to
the fundamental changes in the market structure. Moreover, despite the
reforms which took place one also observes no particular decrease in the
spreads either when the sample is cleansed of the turbulent era observa-
tions of 1996 and 1997. In particular the point estimates for the spreads
are roughly the same for Si for i = 1; 3 and 4: We veried this further
by computing SupLM statistics for the truncated sample S3:
The next four stocks are drawn from a dierent sector, grouping -
nancial holding companies and includes the most actively traded stock
ONA. We notice again the pattern of increasing spreads, except for ONA.
Evidence of a structural break in spreads appears to be present in spreads
for ONA and SNI if we judge the evidence on the SupLM test, and to a
lesser extend for spreads of Credit Eqdom where the 
2
statistic strongly
suggests a break. These four stocks therefore reveal many features simi-
lar to the rst group of four stocks. Among the eight stocks discussed so
far, we have four rms which were the subject of privatizations, namely
BMCE, Credit Eqdom, Sofac Credit and SNI. There is no clear pattern
that shows any dierence between these four and the other rms. This
nding is reinforced by the fact that SupLM tests performed on the S3
sample, which excludes 1996-1997 data, reveals no breaks for the rms
which were privatized prior to 1996.
The nal set of stocks are drawn from the important agricultural
sector. We know from the results in Table 2.5 that they did not pick up
so much in trading activity. Not surprisingly, we see no evidence of any
break in the spreads (except for Lessieur Afrique). The main conclusions
we can draw from these rst estimates are the following: (1) if anything
spreads tended to increase rather than decrease and (2) stocks subject
to privatization programs do not show any distinguished features.
The assumptions underlying the Roll model are fairly unrealistic to
make for the trading activity on the CSE, certainly before and also after
the reforms. However, as far as "misspecication" is a constant factor
throughout the two samples we may nd these rst results giving little
20
support for the view that trading costs were signicantly aected by the
reforms of the CSE.
3.5 Pricing Errors
The pricing errors of the Hasbrouck model are a more sophisticated and
arguably better way of estimating the costs of trading. We report the
empirical estimates for this second model in Table 3.3, focusing only the
parameters directly related to the pricing errors.
26
Besides the param-
eter estimates 
CD
and 
MO
for S1 and S2 we also report an estimate
of the pricing error denoted  which is obtained from imposing the re-
striction 
CD
= 
MO
. Besides the parameter estimates we also report
three SupLM statistics, one pertaining to 
CD
, a second tests stabil-
ity of 
MO
while the third corresponds to . We examine again the
same twelve stocks grouped in three sets along the lines of their industry
classication.
The results in Table 3.3 are fairly easy to summarize, indeed we nd
strong evidence of structural change in pricing errors. Yet, the point
estimates show that in almost all cases pricing errors increased rather
than decreased. This result is not surprising as we reported similar
ndings with the eective spreads obtained for Roll's model. It should
also be noted that the point estimates for the samples S3 and S4 (not
reported in Table 3.3) are close to those of S1: Moreover, one rejects the
hypothesis that 
CD
= 
MO
with the latter always yielding lower point
estimates. Finally, SupLM tests using S3 data for 
CD
; 
MO
and  do
not reject the null of stability of the spreads, notably regardless whether
the rms were privatized or not.
The main conclusions we can draw again from this model are the same
as before, namely: (1) if anything spreads tended to increase rather than
decrease, (2) stocks subject to privatization programs do not show any
distinguished features. Finally, when we compare the pricing errors for
the MO market with those for CD we observe, as should be expected,
that the trading oor has a smaller pricing error compared to the OTC
section of the market. The hypothesis that 
CD
= 
MO
is typically,
though not always, rejected.
26
We refrain from reporting , 

and 

here to reduce the size of the table. For
the same reason we also omit the parameter estimates for the full sample as well as
S3 and S4.
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4 The price impact of large block trades
You will not nd a treasure like this in whole Morocco
...... and it is only 700 Francs
Oooooh but the Lady is a friend of Rick....did I say 700?
You can have it for 200 Francs!
The fact that we have separate data for large block trades provides
us with a unique opportunity to examine the capacity to absorb large
trades. These trades account for a substantial fraction of the volume,
roughly 40 percent as indicated in Table 2.2.
27
It was noted in section
2.2 that large transactions are accomplished through a search-brokerage
mechanism where an intermediary or broker locates counterparties to
a trade. Several theoretical models have been proposed to study such
markets, including Burdett and O'Hara (1987), Grossman (1992), Seppi
(1990) and Kiem and Madhavan (1996).
We start with Table 4.1 where we report the monthly maximum
spread between transaction prices recorded on theMO and CD segments
of the Casablanca Stock Exchange. It allows us to appraise the relation-
ship between transactions on the trading oor versus the upstairs market.
The spreads betweenMO and CD are measured as log(p
MO
t
=p
CD
t
) using
the last transaction recorded whenever transactions on both segments
took place on a given trading day. The spreads are mostly negative and
relatively small during S1, ranging from 0:009 (which is one of the two
positive spreads corresponding to Centrale Laitiere, the other is Sofac
Credit) to  0:020 (for SNI) with most of the spreads in the range of
 0:003 to  0:006: These spreads became large (and all negative) by his-
torical standards, reaching  0:882 (with large standard errors). When
we examine the S3 and S4 subsamples we recover again the phenomenon
of relative stability, i.e. we obtain gures for spreads which are compa-
rable with those obtained from the S1 subsample.
One possible interpretation of the gures in Table 4.1 regarding the
evolution of spreads is that the trading oor segment of the market went
astray with large (Roll) spreads causing large price dierences between
trading oor prices and upstairs transactions. An alternative interpre-
tation is that both markets became volatile and less synchonous. The
latter interpretation is more plausible. To verify this we focus exclusively
on CD transactions and measure the price impact of large block trades
as reported in Table 4.2. The statistics we report are the same as those
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Kiem and Madhavan (1996) note that for the NYSE it is estimated that large
block trades represent about 54 percent of trading volume when a large block trade
is dened as 10000 shares or more.
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in Tables 1 and 2 in Kiem and Madhavan (1996). The comparison with
their results is of interest for two reasons. First, they consider small
stocks on the AMEX, NASDAQ and NYSE. In this regard, our data
shares features with theirs as some of the stocks in their sample have
one single trade, the large block trade, on a given day. Second, their
data also consists exclusively of large block trades, i.e. it is not based
on regular transactions data with a cut-o for the size of the trade. Un-
like Kiem and Madhaven we do not have information which trades were
seller and and which were buyer initiated. Therefore we separated the
data on the bases of the sign of the temporary price impact. The latter
is being dened as logp
CD
trade
=logp
CD
t+1
where t+1 is the day following the
large block trade on the CD segment of the market. If the temporary
impact was positive we classied the trade as buyer initiated while neg-
ative ones are considered seller initiated. Besides the temporary impact
we also report permanent price impacts. These are measured as the
sample averages of logp
CD
t j
=logp
CD
t+1
for j = 1; 6 and 22: We computed
the same sample averages. The results in Table 4.2 are reported for the
same selection of twelve stocks. We report the aggregate results only
and suppressed those for the individual stocks bacause the latter were
based on small samples.
Let us consider rst the buyer initiated trades. Comparing the tem-
porary impact of large block trades from S1 to S2 we notice that the
impact almost quadrupled. For the seller initiated large block trades,
we observe the same order of magnitude. The other two samples show
increases, but they are substantially smaller. As for the permanent price
impacts, it is interesting to note that the results for S1, S3 and S4 are
quite similar to those reported by Kiem and Madhavan (1996), particu-
larly those pertaining to the NASDAQ rms in their sample (they report
smaller price impacts for large block trades on the NYSE/AMEX). For
instance, from t  22 until t+1 the price impact on the NASDAQ is re-
ported as 6:76 (buyer initiated) while it is respectively 5:73 and 6:01 for
S1 and S3. Similarly, comparable gures for seller initiated block are
reported for the NASDAQ, namely  7:05, and between roughly  5:0
and  7:0 for the usual triplet of subsamples. In all cases the inclusion
of the 1996 era increases dramatically the price impact statistics. For
buyer initiated the mean increases to 9:47 and to  9:10 for seller initi-
ated trades. Both gures are much higher than those reported for the
NASDAQ and the NYSE/AMEX as well as those found for the CSE
for all but the S2 subsample. The same pattern emerges for the price
impacts at horizons t  6 and t  1, which are also reported in Table 4.2.
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5 Conclusions
Go ahead and shoot me.....you will be doing me a favor
These feelings expressed by Rick to Isla towards the end of the movie
(and hence the story) sometimes coincide with those of somebody who
tries to do empirical research with recalcitrant data series. It is indeed
a very dicult task to measure the progress that was made with the
various reforms of the market, the nancial sector and the economy in
general. The process of emergence of a market, in particular what makes
it happen, is still poorly understood. The results in this paper suggests
that the cost of trading and the quality of the market if anything be-
came worse, despite the improved liquidity and the increase of overall
trading activity and volume. Obviously, we used some yardsticks to as-
sess the quality of the market. These yardsticks were models of eective
spreads and pricing errors. One could equally well conclude that none
of the models are adequate and appropriate to handle emerging mar-
ket conditions. However, we also noted that if "misspecication" is a
constant factor throughout the various samples we should still be able
to draw conclusions from our analysis despite the shortcomings of our
simple model specications. Moreover, our analysis did rely quite ex-
tensively on descriptive statistics which allowed us to by-pass some of
the criticism one could level against too tightly parameterized models.
The main conclusions we can draw are the following: (1) if anything
spreads tended to increase rather than decrease and (2) stocks subject
to privatization programs do not show any distinguished features. More-
over, the increase in spreads is not purely a reection of increased overall
volatility in the market. The price impact of large block trades, if any-
thing, also increased. All these results are driven not by the pre- versus
post-reform sample split. They are the result of a period in the history
of the Casablanca stock exchange where the market drew a lot of inter-
national attention due to the admission of some of its stocks to the IFC
data base. If one deletes this episode from the data, a period which was
temporary but nevertheless lasted long over a year, one nds very little
evidence in real fundamental changes. This nding is very robust and
transpires through all the dierent measures we studied.
These results are clearly surprising as the liquidity of the market
improved dramatically and barriers to trading were brought down. The
changes in liquidity and transparency were impressive on a relative basis,
however. In absolute terms the CSE is still a very thin market with few
trades, when compared to the standard of developed nancial markets.
Clearly, as far as emerging markets goes, we are still looking for good ex-
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planations to characterize the phenomenon. Microstructure reforms may
be important to signal foreign investors that the stock exchange embarks
on a genuine integration with the world nancial markets. However, they
do not seem to contribute to the eective costs of trading, at least not
during the post-reform period. Presumably, with the adoption of the
screen-driven trading system of the Bourse de Paris one would expect
further improvements in the trading environment. But these improve-
ments came very much after the market emerged.
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Table 2.1: Casablanca Stock Exchange: Basic Indicators
The entries to the table provide annual summary statistics of basic indicators.  They are arranged by column as follows: (1) year, (2)
the number of days of trading in the year, (3) the average daily volume in million of Dirhams, (4) the total market capitalization (5)
the ratio of market capitalization to GNP, (6) a measure of liquidity computed as the ratio of trading volume divided by the market
capitalization, (7) the yield expressed as the ratio of share dividends and market equilibrium and (8) the market index on the last day
of the year.
Year
Number of
Trading
Sessions
Average
Daily
Trading
Volume
Total
Market
Capitalization
Ratio
Market
Cap/GNP Liquidity Yield
Market
Index
1989 248 123 5.0 2.6 2.4 9.0 122.65
1990 244 510 7.8 3.5 6.6 12.3 158.68
1991 243 428 12.4 5.0 3.4 11.2 187.55
1992 248 626 17.0 6.6 3.7 9.3 207.88
1993 248 4611 25.7 10.0 17.9 13.4 259.78
1994 251 7235 39.0 13.1 18.6 11.7 342.33
1995 251 20730 50.4 17.5* 41.1 2.7 342.39
1996 247 19510 75.6 23.0* 25.8 4.2 447.13
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Table 2.2: Transactions Data of the Casablanca Stock Exchange
Entries to the table are the number of observations, i.e. transactions, for each of the two sample sizes.  The subsamples are benchmarked
on the microstructure market reforms of September 21, 1993.  Sample S1 runs from Jan 1, 1984 until Sept 20, 1993 whereas Sample S2
runs from Sept 21, 1993 until April 30, 1997.  The MO market is the floor trading market, while the CD market is the OTC segment of
the CSE.
Sample
Trading Floor
MO (Marché Officiel)
Upstairs Market
CD (Cession Directe) Total Both Markets
S1 (Jan 1, 1984-Sept 20, 1993) 7433 3481 10914
S2 (Sept 21, 1993-April 30, 1996) 11378 4646 16024
Table 2.3: Capitalization, Number of Shares on the Casablanca Stock Exchange
Entries are number of stocks, shares and capitalization on the CSE at pivotal dates of the sample split, i.e. the month of January 1984
(beginning of the sample), September 1993 (end of Sample S1), April 1997 (end of Sample S2).  A more detailed list with each individual
stock appears in the Appendix, Table A.1.
Dates 84.01 93.09 97.03
Total Number of Stocks 62 63 48
Total Number of Shares 24687047 83303717 179784663
Capitalization 1.4 billion DH 22.4 billion DH 94.2 billion DH
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Table 2.4: Trading Frequencies and the Stages of Reforms
Entries to the table are relative frequencies of the number of trades in all the
stocks occurring on the trading floor, upstairs market separately as well as both
markets together.  The sample S1 runs from January 1984 until September 20,
1993, S2 from September 27, 1993 until March 31, 1997.
Trading Floor
(MO Market)
Upstairs Market
(CD Market)
Both Markets
S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
AVG #
Trans. 2.93 12.38 1.37 5.06 4.30 17.44
0 0.32 0.05 0.70 0.19 0.24 0.04
1 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.01
2 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.01
3 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.01
4 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.02
5 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.02
6 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.03
7 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.03
8 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04
9 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.04
10 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.05
10+ 0.04 0.53 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.72
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Table 2.5: Trading Activity of Individual Stocks
For the stocks listed in the left column the following is reported: (1) average daily trading frequency for sample S1 (January 1984 -
September 20, 1993) and S2 (September 27, 1993 - March 31, 1997), (2) the average daily volume for the trading floor market (left
panel) and upstairs market (right panel).  Volume is measured by number of shares traded.  Description of the stocks appears in Table
A.1.  Stocks are ranked according to their average daily trading frequency on the MO market during sample S1.
Trading Floor (MO Market) Upstairs Market (CD Market)
Average Daily
Trading Freq.
Average Daily Volume Average Daily
Trading Freq.
Average Daily Volume
Stock S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
ONA 0.157 0.494 264 5423 0.058 0.261 1668 3555
Brasseries du Maroc 0.142 0.065 275 376 0.082 0.072 2001 1128
BMCE 0.116 0.342 375 1748 0.048 0.186 114 3417
Lessieur Afrique 0.102 0.118 164 238 0.066 0.059 3957 7813
Cosumar 0.099 0.063 78 195 0.033 0.019 8309 9423
Ciments d’Agadir 0.087 0.065 150 240 0.061 0.036 4072 1283
SNI 0.083 0.021 299 1051 0.021 0.022 4871 2831
CMCB 0.082 0.311 1472 1800 0.019 0.150 872 4277
BMCI 0.073 0.171 862 814 0.047 0.050 1468 4610
Centrale Laitière 0.071 0.053 144 127 0.029 0.047 948 7097
Cherifienne d'engrais 0.065 0.036 242 180 0.036 0.028 2033 3594
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Table 2.5 -- cont’d
Zellidja 0.065 0.051 260 289 0.022 0.035 1302 4806
BCM 0.062 0.201 415 37 0.039 0.156 5022 5831
Longometal 0.056 0.045 167 222 0.019 0.017 8688 5168
Cema 0.053 0.016 41 71 0.016 0.023 123 394
Branoma 0.050 0.055 76 37 0.033 0.033 528 6679
Crédit Eqdom 0.049 0.202 911 4898 0.051 0.033 1355 2545
BNDE 0.047 0.068 744 591 0.027 0.053 1788 4515
Somafic 0.042 0.013 1060 484 0.028 0.014 4090 1294
ACRED 0.038 0.029 96 362 0.019 0.013 2402 2844
Sofac-Crédit 0.036 0.188 125 280 0.008 0.057 1471 6153
Cadem 0.033 0.041 117 40 0.019 0.030 4460 9810
Auto - Hall 0.031 0.047 136 93 0.011 0.030 1792 1588
Caranaud 0.031 0.026 117 77 0.008 0.005 406 682
Cherifienne Textiles 0.028 0.013 60 95 0.007 0.016 415 2008
Uniban 0.027 0.030 673 227 0.056 0.027 1064 8548
CTM - LN 0.019 0.300 2526 148 0.014 0.092 5208 5134
Oulmes 0.019 0.016 37 47 0.009 0.025 3116 2965
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Table 2.6: Persistence in Trading and Volatility
Using the transactions data of twelve stocks we consider the regressions
εααεααεαα t1t-10tt
2
1t-10
2
tt1t-10t  + v +  = v  + r +  = r  + r +  = r
where rt is the transaction-based return series and vt is the volume.  Only the slope estimates are reported in the table for the two
subsamples S1 (Jan 1984-Sept 1993) and S2 (Sept 1993-April 1997).  The regressions are estimated via OLS whereas the standard errors
are robustified via the Newey and West (1987) procedure.
r r2 v
Stock S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
CMCB -0.4154(0.1297)
-0.4797
(0.0828)
0.4336
(0.1506)
0.4915
(0.2033)
0.6607
(0.2470)
0.0179
(0.0170)
BMCI -0.3830(0.1418)
-0.5856
(0.0588)
0.3856
(0.2077)
0.5647
(0.0611)
0.3434
(0.1661)
0.0280
(0.0225)
BCM -0.4399(0.1826)
-0.4882
(0.2609)
-0.5552
(0.0451)
0.5015
(0.0455)
0.2170
(0.1862)
0.0207
(0.0137)
BMCE -0.2403(0.0541)
-0.5431
(0.0233)
0.0901
(0.0798)
0.3822
(0.0316)
0.4105
(0.1451)
0.0607
(0.0477)
ONA -0.3587(0.0760)
-0.4681
(0.1352)
0.2904
(0.1247)
0.5003
(0.1999)
1.3091
(0.0869)
0.0245
(0.0133)
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Table 2.6 -- cont’d
Credit Eqdom -0.3266(0.1043)
-0.5194
(0.0723)
0.4185
(0.2058)
0.4930
(0.1634)
0.2906
(0.0865)
0.1258
(0.0928)
Sofac-Maroc -0.0471(0.0703)
-0.3579
(0.0810)
-0.0229
(0.0194)
0.2575
(0.1119)
0.4858
(0.2551)
0.2171
(0.1599)
SNI -0.4436(0.1881)
-0.3251
(0.2021)
-0.3075
(0.1755)
0.1026
(0.0982)
0.4795
(0.1833)
0.5770
(0.1604)
Brasseries du Maroc -0.2916(0.0757)
-0.4934
(0.2377)
0.3212
(0.1810)
0.4969
(0.2446)
0.1459
(0.0913)
0.3326
(0.1674)
Lessieur Afrique -0.3715(0.0923)
-0.5036
(0.0926)
0.4046
(0.1873)
0.4685
(0.0944)
0.0389
(0.0329)
0.2164
(0.1452)
Consumar -0.3601(0.1250)
-0.3371
(0.1336)
-0.0157
(0.0098)
-0.0106
(0.0076)
0.2211
(0.1266)
0.1331
(0.1453)
Centrale Laitière -0.2848(0.1302)
-0.2382
(0.1671)
-0.4506
(0.0913)
0.4201
(0.1498)
0.6157
(0.2100)
0.4745
(0.1758)
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Table 3.1: Cross-Correlations Monthly Volatility, Max High/Low, Roll Spreads, MO-CD Spreads and Price/Volume
Entries to the table are cross-correlations between monthly averages computed from transactions data of the trading floor market segment
of volatility, maximum high/low spreads, roll spreads, spreads trading floor and upstairs trades (MO-CD spreads) and price/volume ratios.
 The cross-correlations are computed for twelve major stocks (appearing in left column) over samples S1 (Jan 1984-Sept 1993) and S2
(Sept 1993-April 1997).
Volatility Max Hi/Lo Roll Spreads MO-CD Spreads Price/Volume
S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.86 0.26 -0.16 -0.58 -0.50 0.45 -0.02
Max Hi/Lo 0.80 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.33 -0.07 -0.51 -0.37 0.62 0.17
Roll Spreads 0.26 -0.16 0.33 -0.07 1.00 1.00 -0.13 0.02 0.04 0.09
MO-CD Spreads -0.58 -0.50 -0.51 -0.37 -0.13 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.04 0.00
CMCB
Price/Volume 0.45 -0.02 0.62 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.00 1.00 1.00
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.98 -0.15 0.75 -0.62 -0.73 0.19 0.90
Max Hi/Lo 0.88 0.98 1.00 1.00 -0.09 0.75 -0.63 -0.72 0.39 0.86
Roll Spreads -0.15 0.75 -0.09 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.15 -0.61 -0.10 0.77
MO-CD Spreads -0.62 -0.73 -0.63 -0.72 0.15 -0.61 1.00 1.00 -0.21 -0.67
BMCI
Price/Volume 0.19 0.90 0.39 0.86 -0.10 0.77 -0.21 -0.67 1.00 1.00
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.03 0.74 -0.17 -0.87 0.09 0.82
Max Hi/Lo 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.26 0.74 -0.45 -0.87 0.37 0.83
Roll Spreads 0.03 0.74 0.26 0.74 1.00 1.00 -0.23 -0.67 0.46 0.70
MO-CD Spreads -0.17 -0.87 -0.45 -0.87 -0.23 -0.67 1.00 1.00 -0.32 -0.57
BCM
Price/Volume 0.09 0.82 0.37 0.83 0.46 0.70 -0.32 -0.57 1.00 1.00
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Table3.1 -- cont’d
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.95 -0.11 0.42 -0.27 -0.78 0.34 0.53
Max Hi/Lo 0.65 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.60 -0.44 -0.82 0.42 0.66
Roll Spreads -0.11 0.42 0.05 0.60 1.00 1.00 -0.05 -0.56 -0.03 0.67
MO-CD Spreads -0.27 -0.78 -0.44 -0.82 -0.05 -0.56 1.00 1.00 -0.16 -0.60
BMCE
Price/Volume 0.34 0.53 0.42 0.66 -0.03 0.67 -0.16 -0.60 1.00 1.00
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.95 0.14 0.55 0.48 -0.35 0.18 0.87
Max Hi/Lo 0.79 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.44 0.43 -0.48 0.38 0.72
Roll Spreads 0.14 0.55 0.25 0.44 1.00 1.00 0.07 0.08 0.24 0.62
MO-CD Spreads 0.48 -0.35 0.43 -0.48 0.07 0.08 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.04
ONA
Price/Volume 0.18 0.87 0.38 0.72 0.24 0.62 0.10 0.04 1.00 1.00
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.93 0.21 0.09 -0.01 -0.95 0.31 0.18
Max Hi/Lo 0.78 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.34 0.29 -0.03 -0.79 0.52 0.39
Roll Spreads 0.21 0.09 0.34 0.29 1.00 1.00 -0.08 -0.01 0.18 0.85
MO-CD Spreads -0.01 -0.95 -0.03 -0.79 -0.08 -0.01 1.00 1.00 0.04 -0.08
Crédit
Eqdom
Price/Volume 0.31 0.18 0.52 0.39 0.18 0.85 0.04 -0.08 1.00 1.00
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.81 -0.07 0.51 -- -0.61 0.08 0.19
Max Hi/Lo 0.25 0.81 1.00 1.00 -0.04 0.38 -- -0.55 0.67 0.50
Roll Spreads -0.07 0.51 -0.04 0.38 1.00 1.00 -- -0.35 0.10 -0.21
MO-CD Spreads -- -0.61 -- -0.55 -- -0.35 -- 1.00 -- 0.07
Sofac
Crédit
Price/Volume 0.08 0.19 0.67 0.50 0.10 -0.21 -- 0.07 1.00 1.00
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Table 3.1 -- cont’d
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.94 0.59 -0.07 -0.85 -1.00 0.10 -0.07
Max Hi/Lo 0.84 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.67 -0.07 -0.88 -0.91 0.20 0.01
Roll Spreads 0.59 -0.07 0.67 -0.07 1.00 1.00 -0.67 0.09 0.55 -0.40
MO-CD Spreads -0.85 -1.00 -0.88 -0.91 -0.68 0.09 1.00 1.00 -0.11 0.08
SNI
Price/Volume 0.10 -0.07 0.20 0.01 0.55 -0.40 -0.11 0.08 1.00 1.00
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.68 0.99 0.15 0.61 -0.61 0.01 0.09 1.00
Max Hi/Lo 0.68 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.21 0.67 -0.50 -0.06 0.27 0.99
Roll Spreads 0.15 0.61 0.21 0.67 1.00 1.00 -0.20 -0.31 0.24 0.63
MO-CD Spreads -0.61 0.01 -0.50 -0.06 -0.20 -0.31 1.00 1.00 -0.08 -0.00
Brasseries
du Maroc
Price/Volume 0.09 1.00 0.27 0.99 0.24 0.63 -0.08 -0.00 1.00 1.00
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.93 -0.09 0.76 -0.28 -0.49 0.46 0.64
Max Hi/Lo 0.83 0.93 1.00 1.00 -0.00 0.70 -0.28 0.53 0.60 0.66
Roll Spreads -0.09 0.76 -0.00 0.70 1.00 1.00 0.08 -0.34 0.00 0.45
MO-CD Spreads -0.28 -0.49 -0.28 -0.53 0.08 -0.34 1.00 1.00 -0.39 -0.39
Lessieur
Afrique
Price/Volume 0.46 0.64 0.60 0.66 0.00 0.45 -0.40 -0.39 1.00 1.00
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.20 0.09 0.08 -1.00 0.12 -0.00
Max Hi/Lo 0.78 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.21 -0.08 0.28 -1.00 0.35 0.05
Roll Spreads 0.20 -0.09 0.21 -0.08 1.00 1.00 0.19 0.09 -0.08 0.45
MO-CD Spreads 0.08 -1.00 0.28 -1.00 0.19 0.09 1.00 1.00 -0.34 0.01
Cosumar
Price/Volume 0.12 -0.00 0.35 0.05 -0.08 0.45 -0.34 0.01 1.00 1.00
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Table 3.1 -- cont’d
Volatility 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.84 0.05 0.08 0.60 0.34 0.41 0.39
Max Hi/Lo 0.62 0.84 1.00 1.00 0.16 0.11 0.90 0.18 0.74 0.61
Roll Spreads 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.11 1.00 1.00 0.10 -0.16 0.13 0.03
MO-CD Spreads 0.60 0.34 0.90 0.18 0.10 -0.16 1.00 1.00 0.60 -0.11
Centrale
Laitière
Price/Volume 0.41 0.39 0.74 0.61 0.13 0.03 0.60 -0.11 1.00 1.00
36
Table 3.2: Effective Spreads Roll Model
Entries to the table are estimates of effective spread based on the Roll (1984) model.  The column Si,MO reports the point estimates of
the effective spreads on the  MO market, while St. Er. is its standard error.  SMOi  is estimated over the full sample i=F (Jan 1, 1984-March
31, 1997) and subsamples Si for i=1,...,4 where  S1 (Jan 1, 1984-Sept 20, 1993), S2 (Sept 21, 1993-March 31, 1997), S3 (Jan 1, 1984-Dec
DQG66HSW’HF7KHFROXPQ66UHSRUWVD 2(1) statistic which tests the hypothesis that the effective
spread is equal across S1 and S2.  The Sup LM statistic tests whether at any point in the sample there was a structural break in the
effective spread.  * Significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Stocks Sample S1 Sample S2 S1/S2 Sample S3 Sample S4 Entire Sample
SMO1 St.
Er.
SMO2 St.
Er.
(1)2χ SMO3 St. Er. SMO4 St. Er. SMOF St. Er. Sup LM
CMCB 3.70 2.72 4.10 2.92 1.09 4.17 2.69 6.17 1.33 3.81 2.77 0.76
BMCI 2.56 0.63 26.88 36.90 7.02*** 2.86 1.13 4.19 1.75 9.09 21.84 13.98***
BCM 2.74 4.60 40.14 62.80 9.27*** 3.73 4.69 8.03 1.70 12.79 36.52 17.28***
BMCE 3.11 0.79 35.47 48.28 42.82*** 3.22 0.76 3.69 3.80 11.81 28.70 51.56***
ONA 7.09 3.07 11.69 7.17 2.04 7.24 2.89 7.88 1.87 8.33 4.96 22.64***
Crédit Eqdom 5.57 3.65 8.69 1.05 11.81*** 5.92 3.38 7.48 0.67 6.41 6.40 7.81*
Sofac Crédit 5.47 2.54 3.89 1.46 0.18 5.27 2.39 4.45 1.37 5.05 2.40 0.10
SNI 1.17 1.83 10.04 4.76 13.08*** 3.23 4.98 12.13 4.48 3.56 4.90 11.22***
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Bras. du
Maroc
3.76 1.60 7.88 11.67 0.92 4.00 1.53 5.08 0.09 4.87 6.42 1.32
Lessieur
Afrique
7.93 1.94 39.90 47.82 6.15** 7.61 1.87 6.27 0.23 16.52 28.44 20.38***
Cosumar 2.79 2.00 9.54 9.25 0.94 3.04 2.88 4.14 5.14 4.60 5.88 0.06
Centrale
Laitière
1.26 6.04 5.36 2.66 0.76 2.37 2.43 7.20 1.10 2.36 2.40 0.18
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Table 3.3: Measures of Market Quality for the Casablanca Stock Exchange
(QWULHVWRWKHWDEOHDUHSDUDPHWHUHVWLPDWHVUHSUHVHQWLQJSULFLQJHUURUVRQWKH02PDUNHW MODQGWKH&’PDUNHW CD).  The column
ODEHOHG UHSUHVHQWVDQHVWLPDWHRIWKHSULFLQJHUURUDVVXPLQJ MO  CD.  The Sup LM statistic tests whether at any point in the sample
there was a structural break in the pricing error.  Samples: S1 (Jan 1, 84-Sept 20, 1993), S2 (Sept 21, 1993-March 31, 1997). * Significant
at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Stocks CD MO Sup LM Sup LM Sup LM
S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 MO CD
CMCB 0.021
(0.014)
0.046
(0.011)
0.008
(0.023)
0.013
(0.006)
0.025
(0.006)
0.028
(0.007
34.43*** 15.08*** 19.92***
BMCI 0.027
(0.005)
0.232
(0.042)
0.010
(0.003)
0.294
(0.064)
0.017
(0.004)
0.250
(0.030)
35.64*** 45.54*** 52.87***
BCM 0.018
(0.003)
0.200
(0.065)
0.012
(0.004)
0.675
(0.050)
0.015
(0.002)
0.318
(0.038)
107.25*** 8.58** 31.46***
BMCE 0.024
(0.004)
0.202
(0.049)
0.014
(0.002)
0.825
(0.018)
0.016
(0.003)
0.443
(0.015)
65.18*** 14.72*** 143.28***
ONA 0.031
(0.008)
0.031
(0.005)
0.033
(0.005)
0.093
(0.037)
0.032
(0.003)
0.062
(0.013)
3.84 24.17*** 25.16***
Crédit
Eqdom
0.032
(0.010)
0.441
(0.194)
0.022
(0.003)
0.696
(0.066)
0.022
(0.003)
0.606
(0.073)
18.56*** 13.01*** 17.32***
Sofac
Credit
0.023
(0.006)
0.014
(0.002)
0.026
(0.010)
0.008
(0.010)
0.024
(0.005)
0.010
(0.001)
27.11*** 13.25*** 96.02***
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SNI 0.041
(0.028)
0.211
(0.078)
0.058
(0.013)
0.183
(0.068)
0.049
(0.051)
0.199
(0.083)
19.19*** 24.25*** 83.01***
Bras. du
Maroc
0.048
(0.011)
0.122
(0.048)
0.029
(0.004)
0.113
(0.058)
0.032
(0.005)
0.017
(0.062)
11.12** 9.36** 12.78***
Lessieur
Afrique
0.041
(0.008)
0.135
(0.039)
0.023
(0.009)
0.336
(0.047)
0.029
(0.005)
0.187
(0.026)
41.44*** 12.06*** 15.92***
Cosumar 0.040
(0.013)
0.014
(0.002)
0.016
(0.003)
0.026
(0.006)
0.031
(0.005)
0.014
(0.002)
12.26*** 29.94*** 46.32***
Centrale
Laitière
0.037
(0.011)
0.018
(0.006)
0.023
(0.007)
0.009
(0.001)
0.032
(0.006)
0.010
(0.004)
101.46*** 29.37*** 54.66***40
Table 4.1: Spreads Between MO and CD Transaction Prices
Entries to the tables are averages of maximum monthly spreads )p/pn( CDtMOtl
using the last transaction of the day recorded whenever transactions in a stock
occurred on both segments of the market.  The averages (and their standard error
reported between parentheses) are computed for samples S1 (Jan 1, 1984-Sept
20, 1993), S2 (Sept 21, 1993-March 31, 1997), S3 (Jan 1, 1984-Dec 31, 1995)
and S4 (Sept 21, 1993-Dec 31, 1995).
S1 S2 S3 S4
CMCB -0.003
(0.045)
-0.017
(0.115)
-0.003
(0.053)
-0.005
(0.078)
BMCI -0.006
(0.042)
-0.470
(1.274)
-0.007
(0.080)
-0.013
(0.165)
BCM -0.006
(0.031)
-0.581
(3.104)
-0.077
(0.791)
-0.383
(1.822)
BMCE -0.006
(0.038)
-0.376
(1.756)
-0.004
(0.052)
0.005
(0.092)
ONA 0.004
(0.058)
-0.066
(0.356)
-0.019
(0.196)
-0.012
(0.429)
Crédit Eqdom -0.001
(0.028)
-0.882
(3.261)
-0.599
(7.224)
-0.191
(6.688)
Sofac Crédit 0.002
(0.041)
-0.013
(0.037)
-0.003
(0.019)
-0.016
(0.042)
SNI -0.020
(0.221)
-0.752
(8.864)
-0.470
(4.860)
-0.421
(6.172)
Brasseries du
Maroc
-0.007
(0.125)
-0.021
(0.055)
-0.010
(0.114)
-0.020
(0.047)
Lessieur Afrique -0.003
(0.072)
-0.276
(1.046)
-0.001
(0.073)
0.014
(0.075)
Cosumar -0.001
(0.055)
-0.527
(3.347)
-0.971
(6.583)
-0.804
(4.290)
Centrale Laitière 0.009
(0.047)
-0.001
(0.045)
0.007
(0.049)
-0.001
(0.056)
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Table 4.2: Price Impact of Large Block Trades
on Casablanca Stock Exchange
Entries are summary information on upstairs-negotiated block trades (CD
segment of the market).  The temporary price impact is defined as p/pln  CDtradeCD1t+
where pCD1t+  is the closing price on the day after the trade on the CD market, p
CD
trade
is the price registered on the block trade.  The permanent price impact is defined
as )p/p(ln   and )p/p(ln  CD1t-CDjt+CDjt-CD1t+  where p and p CDjt-CDjt+  are closing prices.  All
entries are sample averages.  The samples are S1 (Jan 1, 84-Sept 20, 1993), S2
(Sept 21, 1993-March 31, 1997).
Permanent Impact Measured over the PeriodTemporary
Impact
t-22 to t+1 t-6 to t+1 t-1 to t+1
Buyer Initiated
S1 0.39
(1.21)
5.73
(0.33)
4.71
(1.61)
3.39
(2.63)
S2 1.11
(0.82)
9.47
(1.48)
6.38
(1.88)
4.35
(1.67)
S3 0.63
(2.01)
6.01
(1.55)
4.13
(1.73)
3.00
(1.17)
S4 0.91
(1.44)
8.11
(2.23)
5.13
(1.81)
3.77
(1.61)
Seller Initiated
S1 -2.01
(0.24)
-4.85
(0.81)
-3.86
(0.73)
-3.30
(0.69)
S2 -6.14
(3.07)
-9.10
(2.11)
-7.61
(1.91)
-4.18
(1.07)
S3 -3.48
(0.34)
-5.99
(1.73)
-4.33
(1.47)
-3.81
(1.23)
S4 -4.49
(2.02)
-6.91
(1.11)
-5.01
(1.55)
-4.25
(1.61)
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APPENDIX A : THE ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS - A
BRIEF REVIEW
Roughly a decade ago, namely in 1989, Morocco embarked on a set
of reforms which started with ambitious privatization and economic lib-
eralization programs. The main scope of the adjustment program was
to make Morocco's economy more competitive. This could not be ac-
complished without the overhaul of the nancial sector and a privatiza-
tion program targeting the many publicly owned rms. The structural
adjustments undertaken since the mid-1980's took the form of various
economic policy measures which signicantly increased the openness of
the economy. Morocco liberalized its foreign trade, achieved current ac-
count convertibility for residents and capital account convertibility for
foreign investors, relaxed price controls and undertook important scal
and monetary reforms.
28
The reforms of the nancial sector have tended towards the liberal-
ization of interest rates, a decrease in the government access to credit,
the use of direct instruments in the conduct of monetary policy an im-
provement of the supervisory and regulatory framework of the banking
sector and an important reform of the securities market.
29
Morocco's
monetary policy was based up to 1990 on a credit rationing mechanism
limiting the increase in bank loans. After 1990 cash reserves were used
extensively to control the money supply and the rate of reserve require-
ments. To adapt the banking sector to the new, more open, economic
environment, a new law was voted in July 1993. This new law unied
the legal framework for nancial and banking institutions and autho-
rizes foreign banks to have subsidiaries in Morocco. Another signicant
element in the nancial sector reforms was the liberalization of interest
rates which started in 1990. Both the lending and the borrowing rates
were liberalized progressively.
30
The privatization program had many objectives which included eas-
ing the strain the state enterprises were putting on the state budget and
28
A useful reference on Morocco's economic reform program is the 1995 report of
the World Bank.
29
Morocco's nancial sector is composed of 15 commercial banks, 3 foreign oshore
commercial banks, the central bank (Bank Al Maghrib), 23 insurance companies, a
national savings bank, some pension funds, a specialized nancial institution (Caisse
de depo^t et de gestion) and the CSE.
30
The deposit rates were rst liberalized in 1985 for deposits of more than a year,
in 1989 for deposits of more than six months and in 1990 for 3 month deposits and
in 1992 on all time deposits. The lending rates liberalization started in 1990 and the
rate of reserve requirements was increased to 25 percent (its maximum rate) in 1992
due to the important growth in credit resulting from the lifting of the mandatory use
of funds.
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the Moroccan economy. This program, while not directly linked to the
development of the nancial sector, aected it in many ways. The pri-
vatization law was voted in December 1989 and promulgated in April
1990. It authorized the transfer from the public to the private sector
of 75 companies and 37 hotels. It was amended on January 1995 to
include 2 more entities and to move the transfer deadline to December
1998. The methods used in the transfer process are direct negotiation,
tenders and Initial Public Oerings through the CSE or a combination
of the 3 methods. After some delays the privatization really took o in
1993.
31
A total of 22 companies and 17 hotels have been transferred to
the private sector between 1993 and 1996 generating 8.9 billion Moroc-
can Dirhams (DH) of which 32.5 percent resulted from public oerings
on the CSE.
32
. In January 1996 the government issued convertible priva-
tization bonds. The terms of these bonds are that holders have priority
in buying rms to be privatized and receive an annual interest rate of 8
percent at conversion into equity or 8.5 percent if held to maturity. It
should also be noted that a concerted eort was made to sell shares to
domestic small investors. Indeed most privatizations were preceded by
intense ad campaigns. Many of the IPO's were oversubscribed by the
general public. During the ve years following the stock market reform
Moroccan nationals also had a 50 percent tax break on equity returns.
As explained in Section 2, a stock market reform program was under-
taken in the summer of 1993 almost simultaneously with the onset of an
ambitious privatization program. On September 21 1993 three laws (so
called Dahir) came into eect regarding: the Casablanca stock exchange,
the securities commission (Conseil Deontologique des Valeurs Mobilieres)
and the creation of mutual funds. The new laws included changes in the
management and organization of the stock exchange and the way mu-
tual funds operate, as well as scal advantages for shareholders and new
regulations for shareholder protection.
The details of the stock market reform program are described in
section 2. It is worth noting that the daily price uctuations on the CSE
are limited to plus or minus 3 percent. Companies listed on the CSE
are required to report nancial statements twice a year. This reporting
requirement was introduced by the summer 1993 law and includes the
publication of sale revenues and a balance sheet. The withholding tax
on dividends is 10 percent for both foreigners and locals and there are
31
A useful reference on the privatization program is the document produced by the
Ministry of Privatization and the State Entreprise (1996). In addition, the Ministry
maintains a website with information regarding the privatization program: http :
==www:minpriv:gov:ma=index:html.
32
As noted before, one US dollar is roughly 9 DH.
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no foreign investor restrictions.
The stock market reform program can be called a success. The
Bourse de Casablanca was included in the International Finance Corpo-
ration Emerging Market data base in 1996 together with stock exchanges
from two other countries, Egypt and Russia. The IFC attributed a
weight of 0.4 percent to the Morocco index in the computation of the
global emerging market index. This weight exceeds that of Egypt (0.1
percent) and some of the previously incorporated emerging markets such
as Jordan (0.2 percent). A daily index and quotes for some of the major
stocks listed on the CSE were added to the elaborate data set collected
by the IFC.
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Table A.1: Companies Listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange and Number of Shares
A complete list of the stocks traded on the Casablanca Stock Exchange is provided in this table.  It describes all stocks appearing in our
sample, including delisted stocks as well as stocks introduced to the market.  The stocks are ranked by industry. The first two columns
are the ticker symbol and company name.  The next three list the number of shares at three pivotal dates: January 1984 (beginning of
data sample), September 1993 (introduction of market reforms) and March 1997 (end of sample).  The last three columns list the stock
prices for the same pivotal dates.
Number of Shares Stock Price
Ticker Company Name 84.01 93.09 97.03 84.01 93.09 97.03
Banking Sector
1. BCM Banque Commerciale du Maroc 9177812 11155053 13250000 300 380 731
2. BCM "B" Banque Commerciale du Maroc 697752 -- -- 87 -- --
3. BCM "V" Banque Commerciale du Maroc 760848 -- -- 90 -- --
4. BMCI Banque Marocaine pour le
Commerce et l’Industrie
550000 1054952 6187500 124 240 485
5. BMCE Banque Marocaine du Commerce
Extérieur
269096 2871850 14431945 125 230 610
6. Uniban Union Bancaria Hispano Marroqui 176000 2464000 2464000 12 207.21 144
7. CDM Crédit du Maroc 517000 8338176 8338176 126 325 425
8. CMCB Caisse Marocaine du Crédit et de
Banque
647500 5481500 -- 124 156 700
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Table A.1 -- cont’d
9. Wafabank Wafabank -- -- 5481500 -- -- 750
Other Financial Institutions
10. BNDE Banque Nationale pour le
Développement Économique
465988 1118371 12000000 31 80 209
11. CIH Crédit Immobilier et Hôtelier 128000 6280000 10205000 125 160 265
12. Diac-Maroc Diffusion Industrielle Automobile
Agricole Chérifienne
220000 400400 480480 132 170 560
13. Sofac-
Maroc
Société de Financement d'Achat à
Crédit
200000 750000 750000 110 350 525
14. ACRED Société pour le Développement des
Achats par le Crédit
125000 400000 600000 135 250 434
15. CREDOR CREDOR -- -- 1200000 -- -- 645
16. Crédit-
Eqdom
Société d'Équipement Domestique et
Ménager
232500 1111000 1670250 136 230 925
17. SNI Société Nationale d'Investissement -- -- 9900000 103 162 433
18. SNI "V" Société Nationale d'Investissement 1194000 2189000 -- 110 705 --
19. SNI "B" Société Nationale d'Investissement 306000 561000 -- 103 560 --
20. Épargne
Croissance
Épargne Croissance 99640 99640 99640 93 110 --
21. Maroc-
Investissment
Maroc-Investissement 75000 -- -- 100 -- --
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22. CMDE Consortium Marocain de
Développement Économique
100000 100000 --
23. Maroc
Leasing
Maroc Leasing -- -- 1063300 -- -- 264
24. Sinvest Société d'Investissement 100000 100000 --
25. ONA Omnium Nord Africain 760000 9542082 17200000 80 370 715
26. ONA "M" Omnium Nord Africain 150000 -- -- 100 -- --
27. Compagnie
Marocaine
Compagnie Marocaine 224000 224000 -- 550 70 --
28. OMI Omnium Marocain d'Investissement -- 88000 -- -- 130 --
29. Zellidja Zellidja S.A. 572832 572832 572849 400 73.87 360
30. Financière
Diwan
Financière Diwan -- 7001568 8237138 -- 220 262
31. HSM Société de Holding Marocaine 2052 55200 -- 52.93 46 --
32. Finlac Financière Lesieur Afrique 100000 -- -- 140 -- --
33. Rebab Rebab Company -- 64166 64166 -- 56 190
34. CGE Maroc CGE Maroc 186960 1121760 -- 160 309 --
35. Somafic Société Marocaine de Financement
de Crédit
-- 400000 1000000 -- 150 395
36. Diac-
Equipement
Diac Équipement -- 108000 129600 -- 160 381
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Energy
38. Chérifienne
des pétroles
Société Chérifienne des Pétroles 705840 1753390 1754350 19.80 130 377
39. CMM -O- Caisse Marocaine des Marchés -- 5000 -- -- 77 --
40. CMM -M- Caisse Marocaine des Marchés -- 5000 -- -- 77 --
41. Samir Samir -- -- 20641500 -- -- 275
Industrial (Agro)
42. Oulmes Compagnie Fermière des Source
Minérales
90000 150000 150000 80 210 410
43. Lessieur-
Afrique
Lesieur Afrique Casablance 196000 2302626 2763151 175 490 1812
44. Unigral-
Cristal
Unigral Cristal 280000 -- -- 125 -- --
45. SEPO Société d'exploitation ds Produits
Oléagineux
330000 -- -- 90 -- --
47. LGM -o-
"V"
Les Grandes Marques de la Conserve 40331 40331 -- 102 190 --
48. LGM -m-
"B"
Les Grandes Marques de la Conserve 40331 40331 -- 105 156 --
49. Brasseries
du Maroc
Les Brasseries du Maroc 368500 3826250 2826250 155 380 1809
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50. Branoma Les Brasseries du Nord Marocain 100000 100000 500000 145 570 1184
51. Centrale
Laitière
Centrale Laitière Maroc 231000 745689 838900 118 315 2626
52. Somadir Société Marocaine de Distillation et
de Rédification
220000 330000 -- 75 310 --
53. Cosumar Compagnie Sucrière Marcoaine de
Rafinage
-- 1200000 4191057 -- 460 860
54. Sofacal Société Marocaine de Fabrication et
de Commercialisation de Conserves
Alimentaires
-- 48884 -- -- 580 --
Industrial (Textiles)
55. Chérifienne
Textiles
Chérifinne des Textiles 115200 115200 -- 50 125 --
56. Cofitex Compagnie Marocaine de Filature et
de Textile
100000 -- -- 110 -- --
57. Orbonor Société Orbonor 160000 160000 160000 125 125 125
Industrial (Chemicals)
58. Chimicolor Chimicolor 69375 69375 -- 75 75 --
59. Chérifienne
d'engrais
Société Chérifienne d'Engrais 344000 616448 616448 79 129 71
60. Fertimat Fertima -- -- 2300000 -- -- 244
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61. CPCM Compagnie de Produits Chimiques
du Maroc
15000 30000 -- 142.42 350 --
62. Cadem Ciments Artificiels de Meknès 207000 1304100 -- 145 405 --
63. Ciments
d'Agadir
Ciments d'Agadir 172500 2519888 5129772 165 580 570
64. SNCE Société Nouvelle des Conduites
d'Eau
560000 -- -- 130 -- --
65. DOMEC Compagnie Générale de Chauffage et
de Plomberie
30000 -- -- 84 -- --
66. SMCM Société Marocaine de Construction
Métalurgique
337500 -- -- 140 -- --
67. Asmar Société de Ciment de Marrakech -- 161700 2371600 -- 387.20 720
68. CIOR Société de Ciment Oriental -- -- 4210000 -- -- 505
69. Lafarge
Ciments
Société de Ciment Lafarge -- -- 4764305 -- -- 1300
Industrial (Other)
70. Le Carton Société Le Carton 53333 53333 76190 75 185 150
71. Carnaud Société Carnaud Maroc 403920 1445850 1445850 114.86 300 580
72. Cema Contreplaqués et Emballages du
Maroc
151875 151875 -- 250 600 --
73. Gaillard Société Gaillard-Maroc -- 170000 -- 99 -- --
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74. General Tire General Tire and Rubber Company
of Morocco
-- -- 1260000 -- -- 300
75. Sifiche Société Immobilière Financière
Chérifienne
-- 15000 -- -- 75 --
Services
76. Balima Balima 43600 43600 43600 -- -- 390
77. SMM Société Marocaine Métallurgique 272527 368713 -- 75 250 --
78. Sonasid Sonasid -- -- 3900000 -- -- 433
79. Comameto
"V"
Compagnie Marocaine de Métaux et
d'Entreprise
57861 216000 -- 123.92 990 --
80. Comameto
"B"
Compagnie Marocaine de Métaux et
d'Entreprise
58014 -- -- -- --
81. Longometal Longométal Afrique 315360 315360 946080 87 120 150
82. Maysonnier Maysonnier 40000 40000 -- 115 250 --
83. Auto-Hall Auto-Hall -- 230000 460000 -- 750 1545
84. Auto-Hall
"M"
Auto-Hall 130000 -- -- 85 -- --
85. Auto-Hall
"O"
Auto-Hall 100000 -- -- 83 -- --
86. Berliet-
Maroc
Société Marocaine des Automobiles
Berliet
285000 625000 625000 78 100 165
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87. Technical-
Equipement
Technical Equipement 25000 25000 -- 50 50 --
88. Damestoy Damestoy -- 50000 -- -- 50 --
89. CTM-LM Compagnie de Transport au Maroc -
Lignes Nationales
-- 377224 1225978 -- 300 314
Total Number of Stocks 62 63 48
Total Number of Shares 24687047 8330317 178663000
Capitalization 1.4 billion DH 22.4 billion DH 94.2 billion DH
Daily Mean Number of Shares Traded -- 40785 211611
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Table A.2: Privatized Firms Sold Through the Casablanca Stock Exchange 1993-1997
TRANSFERS COMPLETED BY 15 JANUARY 1997
FIRM ACTIVITY SOLD
(%)
DATE METHOD BUYER PRICE PAID
(Million DH)
14.01 12/94 Stock Exchange
underwriting
Moroccans 455.3
26.00 04/95 Tender Moroccan & int’l.
financial inst.
1,243.4BMCE Commercial bank
3.00 12/94 Workers’ payment
for 1995 transfer
Moroccans 82.9
51.00 08/93 Tender followed by
direct negotiation
Swiss, Holdercim,
subsidiary of
Holderbank
614.0
34.00 12/93 Stock Exchange 99.1% Moroccan 329.2
CIOR Cement
1.22 01/95 Workers Moroccans 10.0
18.00 06/95 Stock Exchange Moroccans 72.0Crédit-
Eqdom
Finance-Consumer
credit 1.54 11/95 Workers Moroccans 5.2
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TRANSFERS COMPLETED BY 15 JANUARY 1997
FIRM ACTIVITY SOLD
(%)
DATE METHOD BUYER PRICE PAID
(Million DH)
35.00 07/93 Tender Moroccan, consortium
of financial institutions
111.6
40.00 06/93 Stock Exchange 99.5% Moroccan 94.3
2.60 12/94 Workers Moroccans 5.2
CTM-LN Inter-urban bus
company
18.46 09/94 Stock Exchange Moroccans 48.7
FERTIMA Fertilizers 35.00 10/96 Stock Exchange 98.8% Moroccan 102.1
30.00 03/96 Stock Exchange 99.7% Moroccans 1504.8
SAMIR Oil refinery 1.11 06/96 Workers Moroccans 47.3
15.63 10/94 Stock Exchange Moroccans 361.1
SNI Financial Holding 51.00 11/94 Tender Moroccan & int’l.
financial inst.
1669.0
35.00 04/94 Tender followed by
direct negotiation
Moroccan, consortium
of financial institutions
89.3
18.37 04/94 Stock Exchange Moroccans 40.0
SOFAC/
Crédit Consumer credit
0.81 08/95 Workers Moroccans 1.5
SONASID Steel laminator 35.00 06/96 Stock Exchange 98.3% Moroccan 420.4
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APPENDIX B : TECHNICAL DETAILS OF EXTENDED
HASBROUCK MODEL
In this appendix we provide the technical details of the model dis-
cussed in Section 3.2. Let us begin with reconsidering equations (2) and
(3):
p

= m

+ s

; (8)
m

= m
 1
+ !

; (9)
where m

is the ecient price and !

a serially uncorrelated process
with E!

= 0 and E!
2

= 
2
!
. The process s

represents the pricing
error and is related to the transaction cost as the buyer incurs a cost
equal to s

while a seller faces a cost which amounts to  s

. As noted
in the main body of the paper, we start from a random walk model in
transactions time similar to Hasbrouck and augment it with a drift term
, to obtain in calendar time t, yielding equation (4):
m
t
= 
t
+m
t 1
+ (
t
)
1=2
!
t
; (10)
where 
t
represents the duration in calendar time between two consec-
utive trades. As a matter of convention we set 
t
equal to one plus
the number of trading days between two consecutive trades. So far we
assumed that trades took place on dierent days. For the cases where
more than one trade occurs for the same stock on a given day we set

t
equal to one. As noted before, fortunately we know the sequence of
transactions as they occurred throughout a day, even if they took place
on dierent segments of the market (CD versus MO). This allows us
to compute intra-day returns from trading in a particular stock, keeping

t
always equal to one for intra-daily returns. Using (2) and (4) we can
write the returns (in calendar time) as:
p
t
= 
t
+ (
t
)
1=2
!
t
+ (
t
)
1=2
(s
t
  s
t 1
) (11)
where the normalization with respect to 
t
is also applied to s

to
obtain the calendar time representation. In principle we have to rely on
identication assumptions to disentangle the unobserved components !
t
and s
t
 s
t 1
, keeping in mind that both components may be correlated.
Several univariate time series decompositions have been suggested, most
notably by Beveridge and Nelson (1981) and Watson (1986). One can
cast some microstructure models in the framework of the Beveridge and
56
Nelson and Watson decompositions. For instance in the Roll (1984) bid-
ask model discussed before the pricing error s
t
  s
t 1
is uncorrelated
with !
t
and therefore completely information-uncorrelated. The other
extreme is where the pricing error is entirely information correlated, as
in Glosten (1987). We data recorded separately from the MO and CD
market segments, i.e. two simultaneously operating markets with the
same underlying fundamental price process m
t
but dierent micro- and
transaction cost structures. Since trading oor and OTC markets are not
necessarily occurring simultaneously, we write the expressions in terms
of expectations. Moreover, we are interested in the second moments,
namely:
E
 
(p
MO
t
  p
MO
t 1
)  
t

2
= E
 
(
t
)
1=2
(!
t
+ s
MO
t
  s
MO
t 1
)

2
(12)
for the upstairs OTC market and for the CD market we have:
E
 
(p
CD
t
  p
CD
t 1
)  
t

2
= E
 
(
t
)
1=2
(!
t
+ s
CD
t
  s
CD
t 1
)

2
: (13)
Please note that both equations share the common variance of the
fundamental price process. This will be exploited in the next section to
test whether market reforms aected the pricing errors. Before address-
ing this we will add one nal aspect to the sophistication of the model.
So far we treated the 
t
process as if there was only one market and we
treated the return series as if there were two separate markets. Since the
same stocks are traded on both markets and they only dier according to
their transaction cost structure, agency costs, etc. we need to take this
into account. To do this, the 
t
process will measure the time from the
last transaction whatever market it took place and denote the process
as 
L
t
. Similarly, for the return process of the MO market we examine
p
MO
t
  p
L
t 1
where the index L indicates that the price is taken from
the last transaction.
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The same approach was also taken for the CD
market. The model can then be written as equation (5) appearing in the
main body of the paper:
E
 
(p
j
t
  p
L
t 1
)  
L
t

2
= E
 
(
L
t
)
1=2
(!
t
+ s
j
t
  s
L
t 1
)

2
(14)
for j =MO and CD. Since the process 
L
t
is observable we can estimate
parameters not involving unobserved components via a set of moment
conditions using transactions data from the two markets.
33
As a control we will also computed the estimates with L replaced byMO. They
will not be reported in the paper, as they yielded the same key results.
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We conclude with the details regarding the estimation of the model,
beginning with the following moment condition:
T
X
t=1
 
p
j
t
  p
L
t 1

 
 

L
t



=T = 0 (15)
for j = MO and CD. These two moment conditions (over)identify
the drift . Since we are interested in measuring the component 
!
relative to the total variance of returns, we will have to estimate the
latter. We denote the right hand side of (14) as the variances 
j
where
j = CD and MO when normalized by 
L
. We want to obtain these
estimates via a GMM setup to guarantee that the estimators of 
j
are
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent estimators as described
by for instance Andrews (1991) and Andrews and Monahan (1992). In
order to obtain these estimators, we formulate the following moment
conditions (including those for the 
t
process):

T
X
t=1
 
(p
j
t
  p
L
t 1
) 
 

L
t



2
 
 

L
t


2
j

T

= 0 (16)

T
X
t=1

L
t
=T

  

= 0 (17)

T
X
t=1
 

L
t
  


2

=T   
2

= 0 (18)
where T = Max(T
MO
; T
CD
) in the last two expressions. In contrast
to the analysis in Hasbrouck we have not yet decomposed the variances

2
MO
and 
2
CD
into their common fundamental component 
2
!
and mar-
ket specic noise variance and covariance between fundamental and mar-
ket component if the assumed decomposition is not orthogonal. Yet by
estimating both 
2
MO
and 
2
CD
we can, without any further identica-
tion assumptions, infer some interesting hypotheses. To express these
hypotheses let us dene: 
2
ji
for i = 1; 2 and j = CD, MO as well as 
2
jF
.
The former two correspond to estimates for each market segment and
sample split separately, while the index F stands for the full sample.
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